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In the first chapter of this dissertation, I estimate the cyclicality of real wages for job stayers, and
hires from both employment and from unemployment, using an administrative matched employer-
employee dataset from Germany. I find that the wages of new hires appear to be less procyclical
than the wages of job stayers. The finding can be explained by countercyclical selection: when
aggregate productivity is low, worker-firm matches have to be unusually productive to warrant job
creation. The match productivity (quality) is not observed directly. However, the job duration
serves as a proxy for match quality. I find that the relationship between the initial aggregate condi-
tions and the subsequent risk of separation is negative: employment started when unemployment
is higher is at a decreased risk of ending with a separation to unemployment. This finding indicates
that match quality is countercyclically selected, rising during economic downturns.
Motivated by the empirical findings of the first chapter, I show that countercyclical selec-
tion over match quality arises naturally in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching
model with two key components: match-specific productivity and turnover costs. In the model,
match-specific productivity undergoes countercyclical selection: when aggregate productivity is
low, match-specific productivity has to high to justify creating or maintaining a match. Due to
turnover costs, countercyclical selection for new hires is stronger than for job stayers. The rel-
ative cyclical properties of wages are induced by changes in average match-specific productivity
for new hires relative to job stayers. Lower match-specific productivity of matches started when
aggregate productivity is high leads to higher risk of subsequent separation. I calibrate the model
using external sources. Crucially, observed wage dispersion and hiring costs inform the match-
specific productivity distribution and a hiring cost parameter. The model-generated wages and job
durations have cyclical properties empirically established in the previous chapter: the wages of
new hires are less procyclical than the wages of job stayers, and jobs started when productivity is
higher are at a higher risk of subsequent separation.
In the third chapter, I examine the behavior of wages within employment spells, before sep-
arations from a job and after transitions between jobs. Using German administrative microdata,
I establish three empirical findings. First, the properties of wage changes within employment
spells and associated with job-to-job transitions are broadly similar and follow the same patterns
across demographic groups and time. In particular, the fraction of job-to-job transitions associated
with wage cuts, 31%, is not drastically higher than the fraction of wage cuts in all wage changes
within employment spells, 26%. Second, wages deteriorate in the year preceding separation from a
job, for all separations, including job-to-job transitions. The wage deterioration manifests both as
slower wage growth and as lowering of real wages expected given workers’ characteristics. Third,
for job-to-job transitions wage growth after accession is faster if the initial wage is lower than the
last wage in the previous job. This effect is not present for job-unemployment-job transitions. The
second finding supports the notion that some job-to-job transitions happen because of the worsened
job situation. However, the third finding suggests that, to some extent, workers might voluntarily
make job-to-job transition that decreases their wages in expectation of higher wage growth in the
future.
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Chapter 1
The Cyclicality of Wages and Match
Quality: Empirical Evidence from German
Microdata
1.1 Introduction
Unemployment is volatile relative to aggregate shocks, as discussed in Shimer (2005) and Pis-
sarides (2009). Changes in incentives for job creation are an important driver of unemployment,
since it is driven more by fluctuations in job creation and job finding than by fluctuations in sepa-
rations.1 The incentives for job creation depend on the expected cost of labor, which is proxied by
the wages of new hires. Consequently, the cyclical behavior of wages is crucial for understanding
the cyclical behavior of unemployment.
To investigate the cyclicality of wages, I estimate the relationship between the real wages and
the unemployment rate using a matched employer-employee administrative dataset from Germany.
The dataset allows for differentiating between two types of hires,2 from employment and unem-
1See Hall (2005) or Shimer (2012) for a discussion of the decomposition of unemployment fluctuations.
2The differentiation between hires from employment and unemployment has been neglected in the wage cyclicality
literature until recently. Notable recent exceptions are Getler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016) who find that the wages
1
ployment,3 and addressing the potential biases: due to worker heterogeneity, as discussed in Bils
(1985) and Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994); due to occupational down- or upgrading; and due to
the differences between cyclicality of employment at high- and low-paying firms.4
Contrary to expectations, the wages of new hires are less procyclical than the wages of job
stayers. This effect is stronger for hires from employment than for hires from unemployment. This
counterintuitive result requires an explanation.
I propose an explanation based on countercyclical changes in the quality of firm-worker matches.
Aggregate productivity has a direct effect on wages, as well as an indirect effect due to selection
on match quality that acts in the opposite direction to the direct effect. During downturns, worker-
firm pairs have to be unusually productive to warrant job creation. The average match quality for
new hires is higher than for job stayers. Low aggregate productivity has a direct, negative effect
on wages, as well as an indirect positive effect on the wages of new hires. In contrast, the opposite
happens during upturns, as even low-quality matches are productive enough to be created. High
aggregate productivity has a direct, positive effect on wages, as well as an indirect negative effect
on the wages of new hires.
The presence of the match quality selection effect is empirically validated. As observed in
Bowlus (1995), matches of better quality, which I conceptualize as match-specific productivity,
should last longer. I investigate the relationship between risk of separation to unemployment, a
proxy for match quality, and the unemployment rate at the start of a job. The relationship is nega-
of hires from employment are more procyclical and the wages of hires from unemployment are no more cyclical than
those of job stayers, and Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2013), who find that changes in the wages of hires from
unemployment closely follow aggregate labor productivity.
3Throughout the paper, ”unemployment” refers to both unemployment and non-employment.
4Recently, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012), Kahn and McEntarfer (2014), and Haltiwanger, Hyatt and McEntarfer
(2015) investigated the cyclical properties of employment and employment growth for different categories of firms.
Their findings raise the possibility that lower-paying firms are responsible for a higher share of employment and hires
during downturns, which would introduce procyclical bias into the estimates of wage cyclicality.
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tive: higher unemployment at the start of a job is associated with a decreased risk of a job ending
with a separation to unemployment. This association is stronger for hires from employment than
for hires from unemployment. These results support my hypothesis that matches started during
downturns are positively selected, especially when they are created by a job-to-job transition.
1.2 Related Literature
In this section, I discuss how the results of this paper relate to the literature on the cyclical proper-
ties of real wages and the previous findings on the separation risk as a proxy for match quality.
1.2.1 Cyclicality of Wages
How do real wages react to business cycle conditions? At least since the Dunlop-Tarshis-Keynes
exchange, this simple question has been the subject of a large body of research and is still not
fully answered. In recent years, the interest in this issue was renewed after Shimer (2005) argued
that the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model had difficulty reconciling fluc-
tuations in unemployment and fluctuations in productivity. As emphasized in Pissarides (2009),
establishing how real wages behave over the business cycle is crucial for understanding cyclical
fluctuations in unemployment. This paper belongs to a recent wave of papers that use microdata to
investigate the cyclicality of wages.
Up to the early 1990s, the consensus, based on studies using aggregate data, was that real
wages in the US were acyclical or, at best, weakly procyclical. These studies were suspected to
suffer from various forms of composition bias. As Stockman (1983) surmised, the composition of
the labor force changes over the business cycle: hours and employment of low-wage workers are
more procyclical than hours and employment of all workers, which induces a countercyclical bias
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in an aggregate measure of wages. An opposite procyclical bias was identified in Chirinko (1980)
as arising from high cyclical sensitivity of high-wage industries such as durables manufacturing
and construction.
The use of individual level data shattered the previous consensus, starting with Bils (1985) and
Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994). Wages were usually found to be procyclical.
Newer papers differentiate not only between job stayers and new hires but also hires from
unemployment and employment. A recent example is Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens (2013),
which uses CPS cross-sectional data and finds that the elasticity of wages with respect to labor
productivity is higher for hires from unemployment than for job stayers, and even higher for hires
from employment, although the standard errors are large. A different conclusion is reached in
Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016), which uses SIPP panel data and to finds that the wages of
job stayers are slightly procyclical, the wages of hires from unemployment are acyclical and the
wages of hires from employment are procyclical.
Studies of the US labor market suffer from data limitations. Suitable datasets are, at best,
panels. They contain scanty information on employers and often unsatisfactory information on
workers. Wages, earnings and hours are plagued by measurement error. The use of administra-
tive datasets reduces measurement error issues and allows to control for various potential sources
of composition bias. Recent examples are Carneiro, Guimaraes and Portugal (2012) and Mar-
tins, Solon and Thomas (2012), which use Portuguese Quadros de Pessoal, a matched employer-
employee dataset. In the first paper, the cyclicality of wages is estimated with controls for worker,
job and occupation fixed effects. The wages of new hires are found to be more procyclical than
the wages of job stayers. The second paper concentrates on hiring wages for a set of entry jobs,
which are found to be quite procyclical. Due to limitations of the dataset, these papers cannot
differentiate between hires from employment and those from unemployment.
4
For Germany, Stueber (2017) used a similar source of data as my paper, the employment bi-
ographies generated by the German social security system, but considered the period 1977-2009 at
a yearly frequency. The wages of new hires were found to be no more procyclical, when controlling
for worker and employer-occupation fixed effects, than the wages of job stayers.
1.2.2 Match Quality
Is match quality higher or lower in jobs started in periods of high unemployment than those started
in periods of low unemployment? Match quality, however defined, is not directly observable.
Bowlus (1995) introduced the idea that job duration can serve as a proxy for its quality - better
matches should last longer. Using job duration until transition to different employment or unem-
ployment as a proxy for match quality is equivalent to investigating the instantaneous probability
of separation conditional on previous survival (the hazard rate). Consequently, the relationship be-
tween the conditions at the start of a job and the subsequent risk of separation carries information
about the cyclical properties of the match quality for new hires.
Bowlus (1995), the first to use job duration as a proxy for match quality, found that a higher
initial unemployment rate increased the subsequent risk of separation. This finding, suggestive of
procyclical match quality, motivated Barlevy (2002) to formulate a theory of sullying recessions.
Baydur and Mukoyama (2018) used the competing risks model, finding that a higher initial unem-
ployment rate increased the risk of job-to-job transition but decreased the risk of separation into
nonemployment.
These papers used panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which precluded
controlling for firm heterogeneity. Kahn (2008) exploited a small matched dataset of Fortune 500
firms and their employees. Controlling for firm heterogeneity switched the sign of the relationship
between the separation risk and the initial unemployment rate from positive to negative. I observe
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a similar phenomenon - controlling for firm heterogeneity plays a crucial role in the analysis of the
relationship between the conditions at the start of a job and the subsequent risk of separation. My
findings, together with Kahn (2008), indicate that the average match quality for new hires might
be countercyclical in the US as well as in Germany, contrary to most of previous findings. To
the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to conduct such an analysis controlling for firm
heterogeneity and using a large matched sample of firm and workers.
1.3 Data
I use a German matched employer-employee dataset data provided by the Research Data Centre
of the Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). The Linked
Employer-Employee Data Longitudinal Model 1993-2010 (LIAB LM 9310) contains administra-
tive data on all workers that were employed at any time between 1999 and 2009 in one of the
establishments covered by the 2000-2008 panel of the IAB Establishment Panel. The sample of
establishments is drawn from the population of all establishments with employees subject to social
security and stratified with respect to industry, size and federal state. A detailed description is
provided in Klosterhuber, Heining and Seth (2014).
For each worker, I have information on all employment spells subject to social security between
1993 and 2010: an establishment identifier; sex; education; working hours (full-time or part-time);
employment status (indicators for special status such as traineeship, partial retirement and others);
daily earnings; occupation, with 120 occupational categories; and other information. Job tenure
can be precisely calculated.
The dataset lacks precise information on working hours, but I observe whether a worker works
full-time or part-time. Workers are classified as full-time if their contracted hours are the usual
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working hours in the establishment. Consequently, when I restrict the sample to full-time workers,
the firm fixed effects control for differences in working hours across establishments.
The observations with daily earnings above the legally mandated contribution assessment ceil-
ing (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze) are topcoded. More than 10% of the observations are affected.
Using the Tobit regression with the same control variables as for the censored sample is com-
putationally infeasible. Instead, to establish that it is implausible that my results are affected by
censoring, I use a robustness check the replaces worker and firm fixed effects with the CHK esti-
mates from Card, Heining, Kline (2013). They estimated a Mincer-type wage model with additive
fixed effects for workers and establishments for all West German workers covered by social secu-
rity. The estimated worker fixed effects represent a component of a wage that a worker receives
wherever he works, controlling for his observable characteristics. The estimated firm fixed effects
represent a wage component common to all workers in a firm, controlling for their observable and
unobservable characteristics. The IAB provided a supplementary dataset with the CHK estimates.
The main sample is restricted to the spells of employment in West German establishments that
are the 2000-2008 panel cases of the IAB Establishment Panel. I restrict the sample to men aged
20-60. This restriction is adopted for comparability with earlier studies.
1.4 Empirical Results
This section presents the specification and the results for the estimation of the cyclicality of wages,
and for the estimation of the relationship between the risk of separation and the initial conditions.
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1.4.1 Wages: Specification
The specification for estimating the cyclicality of wages follows Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari
(2016). Data are at a monthly frequency. Let wit denote the real wage paid in period t to individual
i. The wage equation is
log wit = piut + piENHE(i, t)ut + piUNHU(i, t)ut + αi + βj(i) + γ
′
xxit + it (1.1)
where ut is the unemployment rate, NHE(i, t) and NHU(i, t) are indicator variables that take
value one for new hires from employment and from unemployment, respectively. The controls are
worker fixed effects αi, firm fixed effects βj(i), where j(i) denotes i’s employer, and additional
variables contained in vector xit: indicators for both types of new hires; a time trend (calendar-
month dummies and a quadratic polynomial in time); an education-specific cubic polynomial in
age; a cubic polynomial in tenure when applicable; and occupation fixed effects.
Hires from employment are identified as workers that started their current job no more than
14 days after the end of their previous employment and without registering as an unemployed or a
jobseeker. Hires from unemployment are identified as workers that started their current job more
than 14 days after the end of their previous employment or after registering as an unemployed or
a jobseeker. The results are robust to changing the cutoff for differentiation between hires from
employment and unemployment to 31 days and to 7 days.
In Table 1.1, I present the estimates of the wage cyclicality for few variants of specification
(1.1). The results for the full specification are in column (7). Columns (1)-(6) show results for
specifications without some of the control variables. The results from the Tobit regression that
uses an uncensored sample, with the CHK effects replacing worker and firm fixed effects, are
shown in column 5 of Table 1.3. Columns (1)-(4) show results for variants of specification (1.1)
used for comparisons with the Tobit regression. The estimates for a sample that includes part-time
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workers are shown in column 6 of 1.3.
The coefficients of interest are pi, the semielasticity of wages with respect to the unemployment
rate ut, and the incremental effects for hires from employment and from unemployment, piE and
piU . The cyclicality of wages is captured by pi, pi + piE , and pi + piU for job stayers, new hires from
unemployment and employment, respectively.
1.4.2 Wages: Results
The results in the first four columns on Table 1.1 show the estimates of pi, piE , and piU for the
specifications that sequentially add more controls for worker heterogeneity: observable workers’
characteristics in column (2), worker fixed effects in column (3), and occupation fixed effects in
column (4). The estimates of wage cyclicality decrease substantially when controls are added. An
exception are occupation fixed effects, which addition leaves the estimates essentially unchanged.
These results are consistent with both job stayers and new hires having better observable and
unobservable characteristics when unemployment is higher. Cyclical occupational up- or down-
grading seems to have negligible effects.
The addition of firm fixed effects lowers the estimates in comparison with the specification
without any controls, as the comparison of columns (5) and (1) reveals. By themselves, these
results suggest countercyclical changes in the quality of firms that retain and hire workers, although
the firm fixed effects are difficult to interpret on their own since they might pick up differences in
workforce characteristics or differences in usuak working hours across firms.
The estimates from the specifications without and with firm fixed effects in addition to full
worker controls, presented in columns (3)-(4) and (6)-(7), reveal that the addition of firm fixed
effects is unimportant for the wage cyclicality of job stayers but lowers the cyclicality of wages for

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































quality of hiring firms.
The results for the full version of specification (1.1), shown in column (7) of Table 1.1, indicate
that the wages of job stayers are procyclical. However, the wages of new hires are less procyclical
than than the wages of job stayers, since the incremental effects piE and piU are estimated to be
positive. This effect is more pronounced for hires from employment than from unemployment.
Adding occupation fixed effects is again unimportant, as shown by the similarity of the results in
columns (7) and (6) which are obtained for the specifications with and without occupation fixed
effects, respectively.
The robustness check that estimates the wage cyclicality for the whole sample yields reassuring
results, presented in Table 1.3. I compare the results of the Tobit estimation on the whole sample,
column (5), to the analogous results in column (1) from the estimation that uses only the uncen-
sored observations. Both specifications use the CHK estimates as controls for worker and firm
heterogeneity. The estimated wage cyclicality is similar. In turn, the estimates in column (1) are
similar to the estimates in column (2), with occupation fixed effects, and the estimates in columns
(1) and (2) are similar to the fixed-effects results in columns (3) and (4).
I estimate the wage equation using a sample that includes part-time workers, adding fixed
effects for working hours and employment status. The results in column 6 of Table 1.3 are, again,
qualitatively similar to the main results.
1.4.3 Separation Risk: Specification
The risk of separation is captured by the hazard rate defined as the instantaneous probability that
worker i experiences an event, in this case a separation, conditional on the event not happening up




P (d ≤ Devent < d+ ∆d|Devent ≥ d, zid)
∆d
,
where Devent is a random variable, the time from the exposure start when the event happens.




where β is a vector of parameters common for all observations, and h˜jd is the baseline hazard
rate, which might differ across subsets (strata) of observations, in this case firms j = j(i). For
comparisons with previous papers, I estimate two versions of the Cox model: unstratified, in which
the baseline hazard rate is the same for all firms, h˜jd = h˜d; and stratified, in which the baseline
hazard rate h˜jd is allowed to vary across firms.
The stratified Cox model is a modification of the Cox proportional hazards model that allows
the baseline hazard to differ across strata. Stratification in the Cox model is a counterpart of adding
fixed effects to linear models. The strata in my estimation are firms, allowing for differences in the
baseline hazard across firms.
The information set for worker i at time d, captured in a vector zid, includes the unemployment
rate at the start of a job, uinitialij , the indicator for hires from unemployment, H
U
ij , the indicator
interacted with the initial unemployment rate, a time trend, initial wage, current unemployment
rate and its square and other controls for observable worker heterogeneity.
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For comparison with previous papers, I estimate the equation (1.2) in the stratified and unstrat-





xxid + id), (1.3)
also in the stratified and unstratified version.
The results of the estimation of (1.2) with and without stratification across firms are in Tables
1.2 and 1.4, respectively. The results of the estimation of (1.3) with and without stratification across
firms are in Tables 1.5 and 1.6. Columns (1) present the results for separations pooled together,
columns (2) for separations to employment, columns (3) for separations to unemployment.
In specification (1.2), the coefficients of interest are α, which captures the relationship between
the initial unemployment rate and the subsequent risk of separation for hires from employment,
and the incremental effect αU for hires from unemployment. For hires from unemployment, the re-
lationship between the initial unemployment rate and the subsequent risk of separation is captured
by α + αU . In specification (1.3), the coefficient of interest is α.
1.4.4 Separation Risk: Results
The main results from the stratified Cox model with the incremental effect for hires from unem-
ployment, presented in Table 1.2, suggest that a higher initial unemployment rate decreases the
subsequent risk of separation to unemployment but not the risk of a job-to-job transition. This
cyclical property is present, but attenuated, for hires from unemployment. When both types of
separations are considered together, as in some previous papers, the relationship between the ini-
tial unemployment rate and the subsequent risk of separation is negative.
The unstratified Cox model yields different results, presented in Table 1.4. A higher initial
unemployment rate decreases the subsequent risk of separation to employment. When both types
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of separations are considered together, the relationship between the initial unemployment rate and
risk of separation is positive for hires from employment, although not significant for both types of
hires considered together, as shown in column (1) of Table 1.6.
Controlling for firm heterogeneity has similar effects as in Kahn (2008), which used a small
matched dataset with on large US firms and their employees. This raises a possibility that the
estimates of the relationship between the initial unemployment rate and the subsequent risk of
separation that neglect firm heterogeneity are biased.
Table 1.2: Estimates for Job Duration, Stratification
All Separations EE Separations EU Separations
(1) (2) (3)
αˆ −4.532∗∗∗ −0.211 −13.18∗∗∗
(1.693) (2.122) (1.509)
αˆU 0.412 2.366 5.037
∗∗∗
(1.031) (1.556) (1.093)
N 8465856 8465856 8465856
Firms 4137 4137 4137
Workers 269334 269334 269334
Notes: * p< .1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; time-clustered standard errors in paren-
theses; stratification by establishment.
1.5 Conclusions
The relationship between the business cycle and real wages is one of the oldest topics in macroe-
conomics. I explored the previously neglected possibility that the cyclical changes in average
14
match quality are reflected in the estimates of wage cyclicality. Using German administrative mi-
crodata, I found evidence of the presence of countercyclical selection on match quality for new
hires. The estimates of both the wage cyclicality and the relationship between the initial condi-
tions and the subsequent risk of separation support my hypothesis of the match quality selection
effect. In the next chapter, I show that the match quality selection effect arises in a standard
Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model with two key features: match-specific
productivity and turnover costs.
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Appendix A: Wage Cyclicality
Table 1.3: Robustness of Wage Cyclicality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pˆi −0.121∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗ −0.091∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗ −0.018
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.044)
pˆiE 0.922
∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.242) (0.161) (0.178) (0.215) (0.160)
pˆiU 0.389 0.544
∗ 0.338∗∗ 0.384∗∗ 0.306 0.121
(0.327) (0.305) (0.169) (0.172) (0.291) (0.121)
adj. R-sq 0.765 0.774 0.867 0.867 − 0.935
Firms 3434 3428 3427 3421 3439 3433
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Worker FE No No Yes Yes No Yes
Worker CHK Yes Yes No No Yes No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes No Yes
Firm CHK Yes Yes No No Yes No
Uncensored Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Full-Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Notes: * p< .1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; time-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix B: Separation Risk
Table 1.4: Estimates for Job Duration, No Stratification
All Separations EE Separations EU Separations
(1) (2) (3)
αˆ 4.170∗ 11.91∗∗∗ −9.941∗∗∗
(2.254) (3.286) (1.710)
αˆU −4.910∗∗ −5.862∗ 4.389∗∗∗
(2.111) (3.032) (1.658)
N 8465856 8465856 8465856
Firms 4137 4137 4137
Workers 269334 269334 269334
Notes: * p< .1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; time-clustered standard errors in paren-
theses; stratification by establishment.
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Table 1.5: Estimates for Job Duration, All Hires, Stratification
All Separations EE Separations EU Separations
(1) (2) (3)
αˆ −3.959∗∗∗ 0.731 −9.044∗∗∗
(1.397) (1.726) (1.270)
N 8465856 8465856 8465856
Firms 4137 4137 4137
Workers 269334 269334 269334
Notes: * p< .1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; time-clustered standard errors in paren-
theses; stratification by establishment.
Table 1.6: Estimates for Job Duration, All Hires, No Stratification
All Separations EE Separations EU Separations
(1) (2) (3)
αˆ 1.467 9.872∗∗∗ −7.623∗∗∗
(1.528) (2.435) (1.424)
N 8465856 8465856 8465856
Firms 4137 4137 4137
Workers 269334 269334 269334




The Cyclicality of Wages and Match
Quality: A Theoretical Explanation
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I use matched employer-employee administrative microdata from Germany
to establish two empirical facts: the wages of new hires are less procyclical than the wages of
job stayers, and there is a negative relationship between the initial unemployment rate and the
subsequent risk of separation. In this chapter, I show that these properties of wage cyclicality and
job duration arise naturally in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model with
match-specific productivity (”match quality”) and turnover costs in the form of a hiring cost.1
I outline a mechanism that explains how the wages of new hires can be less procyclical than for
job stayers due to the cyclical properties of the average match-specific productivity for two groups.
The wages are determined by Nash bargaining over the match surplus, which depends on aggregate
productivity and match-specific productivity. The average match-specific productivity moves in
1As discussed later, the presence of a firing cost has the same effect.
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the opposite direction to aggregate productivity for both job stayers and new hires, which affects
the wages countercyclically. The presence of turnover costs drives a wedge between the lowest
viable match-specific productivity for new hires and job stayers, making changes in the average
match-specific productivity more pronounced for new hires. As a result, the average match-specific
productivity for new hires is countercyclical in both absolute terms and relative to job stayers,
which dampens procyclicality of the wages of new hires relative to the wages of job stayers.
The presence of low productivity matches that can be created only when productivity is high
drives a positive relationship between initial aggregate productivity and the subsequent risk of
separation, which translates into the negative relationship between the initial unemployment rate
and the separation risk. The low productivity matches undergo an endogenous separation when
aggregate productivity drops.
When aggregate productivity is high, even matches with low match-specific productivity are
productive enough to cover a hiring cost. The matches for job stayers are a mixture of matches
that survived previous periods of low aggregate productivity and matches created in recent periods
of high productivity. Consequently, the distribution of match-specific productivity of job stayers
stochastically dominates the distribution of match-specific productivity of new hires.
When aggregate productivity is low, the matches of new hires have high match-specific pro-
ductivity, because only such matches are productive enough to cover a hiring cost. The previously
created matches with low match-specific productivity are destroyed. The existing matches with
medium and high match-specific productivity are productive enough to survive, even though some
of them are not productive enough to cover a hiring cost. The matches of job stayers are a mix-
ture of matches created in previous periods which are productive enough to survive, and matches
created in recent periods of low productivity. Consequently, the distribution of match-specific pro-
ductivity of new hires stochastically dominates the distribution of match-specific productivity of
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job stayers.
I calibrate the model using external sources to inform the value of a hiring cost and the dis-
tribution of match-specific productivity. I compare the cyclical properties of the model-generated
wages and the observed wages, and the properties of job duration for generated job spells and
the observed spells. The model-generated wages have similar cyclical properties as the observed
wages: the wages of new hires are less procyclical than the wages of job stayers. Matches created
when aggregate productivity are at a decreased risk of subsequent separation.
2.2 Related Literature
The key elements of the model I use are match-specific productivity and turnover costs. Both
features appeared in the previous literature. However, their interaction and consequences for the
cyclical properties of wages were unexplored.
2.2.1 Match-Specific Productivity
The match quality defined as the idiosyncratic productivity of a worker-firm pairing was popular-
ized by Jovanovic (1979 a,b; 1984). In the Jovanovic learning model, the match quality is a pure
experience good: it is assigned randomly when a job is created and its value is revealed over tenure
by observed output. Moscarini (2005) embeds this idea into the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
search and matching model, with the match quality taking only one of two values. The conse-
quences for wages in a steady state are considered: the selection on match quality moves workers
to matches with higher perceived quality and higher wages, giving the wage distribution a long and
fat right tail, which is observed empirically.
Pries and Rogerson (2005) combine a variant of the Jovanovic learning model, in which the
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match quality is partially an inspection and partexperience good, and the Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides search and matching model to investigate the steady state effects of, among others,
turnover costs in the form of dismissal costs. In this variant of the learning model, a firm and a
worker receive a signal before a match is formed, giving them a probability of the match being bad
or good. The match quality is then revealed gradually by output observations. Similarly to this
paper, the higher dissmisal costs push up the threshold for the signal about match quality above
which matches are accepted.
More generally, the standard assumption in the search and matching literature is that new
matches start with the same match-specific productivity, which later evolves, as in Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), Pissarides (2009), and Fuijta and Ramey (2012). Matches were allowed to
start with randomly drawn productivity in Mortensen (1982) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007b).
However, the consequences of the presence of match-specific productivity for the cyclical proper-
ties of wages were not investigated.
A paper closely related to mine is Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016). They build a model
with match-specific productivity, which takes two values, and endogenous on-the-job search. The
model generates a procyclical selection effect for new hires from employment. An interesting im-
plication is that jobs created by a job-to-job transition during downturns should be at an increased
risk of ending with a subsequent job-to-job transition. The implication was not investigated in the
paper.
The consequences of match quality selection for wages appear in a different context in Hage-
dorn and Manovskii (2013). They argue that when wages depend on current conditions and match-
specific productivity, past selection over match quality makes wages appear to depend on past
labor market conditions summarized by the lowest unemployment rate during a job spell. Their
preferred proxies for match quality are derived from measures of labor market tightness during a
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job spell and an employment cycle. In future empirical work, I plan to use information on past
and future labor market conditions to control for match quality in the estimation of cyclicality of
wages, along the lines of Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013), but
with a focus on the most adverse labor market conditions which a job survives.
2.2.2 Turnover Costs
Turnover (hiring or firing) costs were added to the search and matching model in Braun (2006),
Nagypal (2007), Silva and Toledo (2009) and Yashiv (2006). Turnover costs improve the perfor-
mance of the model by making firms’ net profits more responsive to changes in productivity.
Muehlemann and Pfeifer (2016) use a German firm-level survey from the 2000s to assess the
recruitment and adaptation costs generated by job creation. The average total hiring cost in Ger-
many was equal to more than 2 months of wage payments, with two-thirds of this cost incurred
when a worker was hired, and one-third generated by vacancy creation and screening of applica-
tions. I use the provided ratio of a hiring cost to wages in my model calibration. For the US, Dube
et al. (2010) assess the average total hiring cost to be approximately 1.1 of the monthly wages in
California, which suggests that the hiring cost should be twice as high in Germany as in the US.
A characteristic feature of the German labor market is that the firing costs are high. Unlike in
the US, an employee with a permanent contract that is dismissed on operational grounds is entitled
to severance pay equal to half of a monthly wage for each year of tenure, up to 12 monthly wages
for most workers, and even more for older workers with long tenure.
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2.3 Selection Effect: Stylized Example
In this section, I use a stylized example to illustrate the mechanism generating the cyclical prop-
erties of wages and job duration. Aggregate productivity takes two values, low y1 and high y2;
match-specific productivity has three values z1, z2, and z3, such that z1 < z2 < z3; and agents are
myopic, discounting with factor 0. I leave vacancy creation decision unspecified, assuming only
that vacancies are created in both aggregate states, and that there are no more vacancies created in
the low productivity state than in the high productivity state.
A worker in a match with match-specific productivity z produces zy when aggregate produc-
tivity is y, receiving a fraction τ of his output. His employer receives (1− τ)zy. The worker quits
if his wage τzy is lower than the unemployment benefit b.2 The probability that an exogenous
separation occurs is δ.
When an unemployed worker and a vacancy-posting firm meet, they draw value z of match-
specific productivity from a fixed distribution. The firm has to incur a sunk cost h, but only if a
job is created. The firm wants to create a job if its per-period earnings would cover the hiring cost,
(1 − τ)zy ≥ h. The worker wants the job if his wage would be no less than the unemployment
benefit, τzy ≥ b.
Figure 1 summarizes the model under parameter values ensuring that the match quality selec-
tion effect is present. The parameters have to satisfy the inequalities
z3 ≥ h
(1− τ)y1 > z2 ≥
b
τy1
> z1 ≥ h
(1− τ)y2 (2.1)
which is possible. When aggregate productivity is high, all possible matches produce enough
output to be preferable to unemployment for workers and to justify job creation for firms. There are
2For clarity of exposition, I assume that a firm and a worker split the match output zy, not the surplus zy − b. The
reasoning goes through when they split the surplus instead.
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no endogenous separations. When aggregate productivity is low, the lowest-productivity matches
are destroyed, because workers find unemployment preferable. The medium-productivity matches
are preferable to unemployment for workers, but are not productive enough to cover the hiring cost,
which means that the existing medium-productivity matches survive but there no new medium-
productivity matches.
In the low productivity state, there are no less separations than in the high state - endogenous
separations happen only in the first period after a drop in aggregate productivity, and the rate of
exogenous separations is constant. Under the assumption that vacancy creation does not increase
in the low productivity state, and taking into account that some worker-firm meetings in the low
state do not lead to match creation due to drawing low match-specific productivity, there is less job
creation when aggregate productivity is low. Consequently, the unemployment rate rises in the low
productivity state.
Because unemployment is higher when aggregate productivity is lower, the relationships be-
tween the model outcomes, the wages and job durations, and aggregate productivity translate into
the relationships between the model outcomes and the unemployment rate. I show that the wages
and job durations generated in a model that satisfies the condition (2.1) have the desired cyclical
properties.
The relationship between the initial unemployment rate and the subsequent risk of separation is
negative. The risk of exegenous separation is constant and independent of initial conditions. Only
endogenous separations are those of workers that quit low-productivity matches when aggregate
productivity is low.
I proceed to show that the wages of new hires are less procyclical than the wages of job stayers.
The cyclical properties of wages result from the properties of the distributions of match-specific
productivity for new hires and job stayers. The distribution of match-specific productivity for new
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hires stochastically dominates the distribution of match-specific productivity for job stayers when
aggregate productivity is low, but the reverse happens when aggregate productivity is high.
The distribution of match-specific productivity for new hires is the same as the underlying
distribution of match-specific productivities when aggregate productivity is high. When aggregate
productivity is low, all match-specific productivities of new hires are equal to z3. Consequently,
the mean wages of new hires are wH2 = τy2Ez and w
H
1 = τy1z3, in upturns and in downturns,
respectively.
When aggregate productivity is high, job stayers belong to one of three groups: workers that
were hired during the current upturn, with the same match-specific productivity distribution as
the underlying distribution of match-specific productivities, which mean is Ez; workers that were
hired during a previous upturn and remained employed during a downturn, with a match-specific
productivity distribution that is a truncation of the underlying distribution of match-specific pro-
ductivities without z1, which mean is Ez|z > z1; and workers that were hired during a previous
downturn, who are employed exclusively in matches with productivity z3. Let the fractions of the
second and third group of workers in the total number of employed workers be pi and pi′.
The distribution of match-specific productivity for job stayers during upturns is a mixture of
three distributions. Two of these distributions stochastically dominate the match-specific produc-
tivity distribution for new hires, one of them is the same distribution. Consequently, the distribution
of match-specific productivity for job stayers stochastically dominates the distribution of match-
specific productivity for new hires.
The mean wage of job stayers is
wS2 (pi, pi
′) = (1− pi − pi′)τy2Ez + piτy2Ez|z > z1 + pi′τy2z3
where pi, pi′ ∈ [0, 1], such that pi + pi′ ∈ [0, 1], depend on the rate of exegenous separations, and
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history of vacancy creation and of aggregate states. The mean wage of job stayers, wS2 (pi, pi
′), is
higher than the mean wage of new hires, wH2 = τy2Ez, as long as pi + pi
′ < 1.
When aggregate productivity is low, job stayers belong to one of two groups: workers that were
hired during the current or a previous downturn, who are employed exclusively in matches with
productivity z3; or workers that were hired during a previous upturn and remain employed during
a downturn, with a match-specific productivity distribution that is a truncation of the underlying
distribution of match-specific productivities without z1, which mean is Ez|z > z1. Let the fraction
of the second group of workers in the total number of employed workers be γ.
The distribution of match-specific productivity for job stayers during downturns is a mixture
of 3 distributions. One of these distributions is stochastically dominated by the match-specific
productivity distribution for new hires, the other two are the same distribution. Consequently, the
distribution of match-specific productivity for new hires stochastically dominates the distribution
of match-specific productivity for job stayers.
The mean wage of job stayers is
wS1 (γ) = (1− γ)τy1z3 + γτy1Ez|z > z1
where γ ∈ [0, 1] depends on the rate of exegenous separations, and history of vacancy creation and
of aggregate states. The mean wage of job stayers, wS1 (γ), is lower than the mean wage of new
hires, wH1 = τy1z3, as long as γ > 0.






















When wH1 < w
h
2 , which is guaranteed by assuming that y1z3 < y2Ez, inequalities (2.2) show
that, in percentage terms, the mean wages of new hires respond less to aggregate productivity than
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the mean wages of job stayers. Consequently, regressing the logarithms of wages on aggregate
productivity or unemployment, leads to the conclusion that the wages of new hires are less pro-
cyclical than the wages of job stayers, even though all wages are equally and fully responsive to
aggregate conditions.
2.4 Model
I build a variant of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model. The two crucial
elements of the model are match-specific productivity and a hiring cost.
2.4.1 Model Outline
There is a continuum of workers with measure one and a continuum of firms. Each firm turns one
unit of labor into r(y, z) units of output, where r is an increasing function of aggregate productivity
y and match-specific productivity z. I use the standard production function r(y, z) = yz. The
unemployed workers receive a flow benefit b.
The workers and firms are risk-neutral. They maximize the expected sum of periodical in-
comes. The discount factor is β.
34
The aggregate productivity, y, is the same for all firms, with values in the set Y = {y1, y2, .., yNY },
where y1 < y2 < ... < yNY and NY ≥ 2. The aggregate productivity y is updated to yˆ at the be-
ginning of the next period with probability fY (y, yˆ), where fY : Y 2 → [0, 1].
The match-specific productivity, z, with values in the setZ = {z1, z2, .., zNZ}, where z1 < z2 <
... < zNZ and NZ ≥ 2, is fixed for each match after being drawn from a probability distribution
with a cumulative distribution function FZ . The match-specific productivity is drawn when a
worker and a firm meet, but before a worker is hired.
The notation for value functions is standard. The value of match to the firm, the value of match
to the worker, the value of unemployment to the worker, and the match surplus are denoted as
J(y, z), W (y, z), U(y), and S(y, z) = J(y, z) +W (y, z)− U(y).
The Nash bargaining divides the match surplus. The contract between a firm and its employee
specifies the wagew(y, z). The wage equalizes the worker’s surplusW (y, z)−U(y) with τS(y, z),
where τ ∈ [0, 1] is the workers’ bargaining power parameter.
There is a hiring cost h ≥ 0 that has to paid in the first period of employment. This is a sunk
cost that is incurred only if a job is created and that does not enter into the match surplus.
The firms create vacancies which meet workers through a frictional meeting process. The
number of meetings is determined by a CRS matching function M(u, v), which depends on the
mass of created vacancies, v, and the mass of workers looking for jobs, u. The probabilities that the
workers and vacancies meet is M(u, v)/u for workers and M(u, v)/v for the vacancies, which can
be written as functions of labor market tightness θ = v/u. An unemployed worker meets a vacancy
with probability p(θ) = M(1, θ), a vacancy meets a worker with probability q(θ) = M(θ−1, 1).
The zero profit condition determines vacancy creation. The firms’ expected profit from vacancy
creation depends on the probability of meeting a worker and the expected value of meeting a
worker, denoted as J˜(y). If the expected value exceeds the cost of vacancy creation, c > 0,
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vacancies are created until the expected profit is driven to zero. If the expected value is less than




−1(c/J˜(y)), if J˜(y) ≥ c
0. if J˜(y) < c.
(2.3)
Matches are destroyed if the surplus S(y, z) is negative and with the exogenous separation
probability δ ∈ (0, 1). For simplicity, I assume that the workers who lose a job cannot find a new
one in the same period.
2.4.2 Value Functions
The match surplus S is a sum of the firm’s surplus, J , and the worker’s surplus, W −U , where W
and U are the value of employment and unemployment. The Nash bargaining leads to the condition
J(y, z)
1− τ = S(y, z) =
W (y, z)− U(y, z)
τ
.






1{(1− τ)S(yˆ, z) < h}dFZ(z)U(yˆ)
+ p(θ(yˆ))
∫
1{(1− τ)S(yˆ, z) ≥ h}W (yˆ, z)dFZ(z)
]





1{(1− τ)S(yˆ, z) ≥ h}τS(yˆ, z)dFZ(z)
]
.
The value accruing to an employed worker is
W (y, z) =w(y, z) + βE
[
δU(yˆ)
+ (1− δ)1{S(yˆ, z) < 0}U(yˆ)
+ (1− δ)1{S(yˆ, z) ≥ 0}W (yˆ, z)
]
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which can be rewritten as
W (y, z) =w(y, z) + βE
[
U(yˆ) + (1− δ)1{S(yˆ, z) ≥ 0}τS(yˆ, z)
]
.
The value accruing to a firm employing a job stayer is
J(y, z) =r(y, z)− w(y, z) + βE(1− δ)1{S(yˆ, z) ≥ 0}J(yˆ, z)
which can be rewritten as
J(y, z) =r(y, z)− w(y, z) + βE(1− δ)1{S(yˆ, z) ≥ 0}(1− τ)S(yˆ, z).
The surplus S can be rewritten as
S(y, z) =r(y, z)− b+ βE
[
(1− δ)1{S(yˆ, z) ≥ 0}S(yˆ, z)−
p(θ(yˆ))
∫




The expected value of meeting a worker is
J˜(y) =
∫
1{(1− τ)S(y, z) ≥ h}((1− τ)S(y, z)− h)dFZ(z). (2.5)
2.4.3 Equilibrium
The equations (2.3)-(2.5) define a functional operator. An equilibrium is a surplus function S
satisfying the equation (2.4), where a market tigthness function θ is dictated by the equations (2.5)
and (2.3). The equilibrium is a fixed point of a functional operator.
The equilibrium operator is not continuous, which is the the only obstacle that precludes prov-
ing the equilibrium existence with the use of the Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem.3 I consider a
3The standard method of proving the equilibrium existence and uniqueness by proving that the equilibrium operator
satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient conditions, as in Mortensen and Nagypal (2007b), is not applicable, because terms of
the type 1{x ≥ 0}x introduce non-convexity.
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proxy of the model. In the proxy model, the equilibrium operator is continuous. I prove the equi-
librium existence for the proxy model in Appendix A. If, in the equilibrium, the proxy model
reduces to the original model, then the equilibrium of the proxy model is also an equilibrium of the
original model. The discontinuity of the equlibrium operator stems from the presence of a hiring
cost that is excluded from the match surplus. The existence of an equilibrium in a model in which
a hiring cost enters the match surplus can be proved directly.
I use the Brouwer’s theorem, which does not guarantee the equilibrium uniqueness and is not
constructive. However, I take the advantage of the properties of the equilibrium operator, which can
be decomposed in a sum of its increasing and decreasing parts. I adopt a method that numerically
narrows the space of potential equilibria, which I discuss in Appendix B.
2.4.4 Match Creation and Match Survival Thresholds
When aggregate productivity is y, a match with match-specific productivity z is not endogenously
destroyed if the condition S(y, z) ≥ 0 is satisfied, and can be created if the condition S(y, z) ≥
h is satisfied. When S(y, z) is increasing in the second argument, z, there are match-specific
productivity thresholds for match survival and match creation,
zs(y) = min
z∈Z




{S(y, z) ≥ h},
with the following properties: z > zs(y) implies that S(y, z) ≥ 0 and a match with match-specific
productivity z is not endogenously destroyed; z > zc(y) implies that S(y, z) ≥ h and a match with
match-specific productivity z can be created; and zc(y) ≤ zs(y), the threshold for match creation
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is more demanding than for match survival. When S(y, z) is also increasing in the first argument,
y, the thresholds are non-increasing functions of aggregate productivity, y.
For the highest aggregate productivity, yNY , it can be assumed without loss of generality that
the thresholds for match survival and match creation coincide, zc(yNY ) = z
s(yNY ) = z1, which
together with zs(y) ≤ zc(y) implies that
zc(yNY ) = z
s(yNY ) ≤ zc(y) ≤ zs(y) (2.6)
for any aggregate productivity y.
2.4.5 Match-Specific Productivity for New Hires and Job Stayers
To illustrate the selection effect it is sufficient to consider two aggregate productivity states, low
y1 and high y2. In this section, I show that the selection effect is present if there are some matches
that can survive but cannot be created when aggregate productivity is low, zs(y1) < zc(y1), which
together with (2.6) implies that
zs(y1) < z
c(y1) ≤ zc(y2) = zs(y2). (2.7)
There are four groups of workers whose match-specific productivity distributions I consider,
new hires and job stayers when aggregate productivity is low and when aggregate productivity is
high.
A match-specific productivity distribution for new hires, H(z; y), is a truncation of the un-
derlying match-specific productivity distribution, F , that restricts its domain to match-specific
productivities that are above the match creation threshold
H(z; y) =
F (z)
1− F (zc(y)) .
For high aggregate productivity, y2, the distributions H(z; y) and F (z) coincide.
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The inequalities (2.7) guarantee that there are some matches that can survive but cannot be




1− F (zs(y1)) .
When aggregate productivity is low, job stayers belong to one of two groups: workers that were
hired during the current or a previous episode of low productivity, whose match-specific produc-
tivity distribution is H(z; y1); or workers that were hired during an episode of high productivity
and remain employed during a downturn, whose match-specific productivity distribution is P (z).
The match-specific productivity distribution for job stayers is
G(z; y1, γ) = (1− γ)H(z, y1) + γP (z)
where γ ∈ [0, 1], the fraction of the second group of workers, decreases in the duration of low-
productivity episode.
When aggregate productivity is high, job stayers belong to one of three groups: workers that
were hired during the current episode of high productivity, whose match-specific productivity dis-
tribution is H(z; y2); workers that were hired during a previous episode of high productivity and
remained employed during a previous episode of low productivity, whose match-specific produc-
tivity distribution is P (z); or workers that were hired during a previous episode of low productivity,
whose match-specific productivity distribution is H(z; y1). The match-specific productivity distri-
bution for job stayers is
G(z, y2, pi, pi
′) = (1− pi − pi′)H(z, y2) + piP (z) + pi′H(z, y1)
where the fractions of the second and third group of workers are pi and pi′, which decrease in the
duration of high-productivity episode.
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The inequalities (2.7) imply that the match-specific productivity distributions can be ordered
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. The ordering H(z; y2), P (z) ≺ H(z; y1) implies the
ordering
H(z; y2) ≺ G(z, y2, pi, pi′), G(z; y1, γ) ≺ H(z; y1). (2.8)
The first-order stochastic dominance ordering (2.8) implies inequalities between the means
of the four distributions. The mean match-specific productivity for new hires when aggregate
productivity is high is the lowest of the four means, the mean match-specific productivity for new
hires when aggregate productivity is low is the of the four means, and the means for job stayers lie
between these two extremes. When the means ofH(z; y2),G(z, y2, pi, pi′),G(z; y1, γ) andH(z; y1)
are denoted as z¯H2 , z¯
S
2 (pi, pi
′), z¯S1 (γ) and z¯
H




′), z¯S1 (γ) < z¯
H
1 (2.9)
The inequalities (2.9) lead to a conclusion that the mean match-specific productivity for new
hires is countercyclical, rising when aggregate productivity is lower, and that its cyclical changes
are smaller than the cyclical changes in the mean match-specific productivity for job stayers.
2.4.6 Calibration
The calibration is at a monthly frequency. The model has 11 parameters, summarized in Table 2.1.
For 4 parameters I use paremeters values that are common in the literature. I calibrate 7 remaining
parameters using external information.
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Table 2.1: Model Parameters
Value Description Target/Source
h = 1.9 hiring cost Muehlemann and Pfeifer (2016)
σ = 0.3 sd of log match productivity Card, Heining, and Kline (2013)
β = 0.9966 discount factor standard, annual interest rate 4.17%
η = 0.5 matching function elasticity standard, Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001)
τ = 0.5 workers’ bargaining power standard, Hosios’ condition, τ = η
σy = 0.02 aggregate productivity sd standard, Shimer (2005)
ρ = 1/24 transition probabilities standard, 2-year long recessions
δ = 0.0095 exogenous separation rate separations, Elsby et al. (2013), Nordmeier (2014)
b = 0.55 unemployment benefit Krause and Uhlig (2012)
c = 0.42 vacancy creation cost un, job finding, Elsby et al. (2013), Nordmeier (2014)
κ = 0.35 matching efficiency un, job finding, Elsby et al. (2013), Nordmeier (2014)
The key features of the model are a hiring cost and match-specific productivity. I use external
sources to inform the value of the hiring cost and the match-specific productivity distribution.
The hiring cost h is calibrated to be approximately 1.3 of the mean monthly wage, as calculated
by Muehlemann and Pfeifer (2016) from a survey of German firms.
I follow the literature and assume that match-specific productivity has a lognormal distribution
with a standard deviation σ. The data moment used to calibrate σ is the standard deviation of
the residual log wages, taken from Card, Heining, and Kline (2013), who estimated the Mincer
equation for log wages using the whole universe of German labor market biographies.
The parameters β, η, τ and ρ have values standard in the literature. The aggregate productivity
is either low, 1 − σy, or high, 1 + σy. Tha parameter σy targets the standard deviation 0.02 of log
labor productivity, as in Shimer (2005).
The exogenous separation rate δ = 0.095 is equal to the lower values of the monthly separation
rate in the 2000s calculated in Nordmeier (2014) and consistent with previous calculations in Elsby
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et al. (2013).
The unemployment benefit b is calibrated to target 0.4 of mean monthly labor income, as in
Krause and Uhlig (2012) for the post-Hartz period.
I use the standard matching function M(u, v) = κuηv(1−η).4. The vacancy creation cost c and
the matching function efficiency parameter κ are jointly calibrated to match the mean monthly job
finding rate calculated in Nordmeier (2014) and Elsby et al. (2013), around 0.055− 0.07, and the
mean monthly unemployment rate 0.09.
The model outcomes, summarized and compared with target moments in Table 2.2, are gen-
erated from simulations of the model with 2400 monthly observations on 10000 workers with 51
possible match-specific productivities.
Table 2.2: Model Fit
Outcome Target Description
1.29 1.3 hiring cost relative to w
0.11 0.14 sd of (residual) log wages
0.37 0.4 unemployment benefit relative to w
0.12 0.09 unemployment rate
0.01 0.01 separation rate
0.07 0.055-0.07 job finding rate
Notes: w denotes mean labor income.
2.4.7 Properties of Model-Generated Data
The first empirical finding of the previous chapter is that the wages of new hires are less procyclical
than the wages of job stayers. To confirm that this cyclical property arises in the model, I estimate




log wit = piut + piUNHU(i, t)ut + γNHU + it (2.10)
where wit is the wage paid in period t in match i, ut is the unemployment rate, and NHU(i, t) is
an indicator variable that takes value one for new hires, using simulated wages.
Table 2.3 shows the averaged estimates from Equation 2.10. The wages have the key cyclical
property matching the empirical findings from the previous chapter: the estimated incremental
effect pˆiU = 0.46 is positive and significant, and of similar magnitude as the analogous estimate in
the previous chapter. For all simulations, the estimates are significant and have the desired cyclical
properties.
Table 2.3: Wage Cyclicality Estimates for Model-Generated Wages
pˆi −1.85
pˆiU 0.46
Notes: Average values from 5 simulations of 2400 monthly observa-
tions on 20000 workers with 51 possible match-specific productivities.
To complete the analysis of cyclical properties of wages, I solve and simulate the model with-
out a hiring cost, setting h = 0. Table 2.4 shows averages of estimates of Equation 2.10 for
simulated wages. The baseline estimate of wage cyclicality, pˆi, decreases from −1.85 to −2.54.
The incremental effect for wages of new hires, pˆiU , is small and insignificant in all simulations.
The differences between the cyclical properties for the model with and without a hiring cost
are expected. The thresholds for match creation and match maintenance coincide in this model,
which implies the wages of job stayers and new hires have the same cyclicality. In the model with
a hiring cost, when aggregate productivity is low, a fraction of job stayers are workers that were
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hired during the current episode of low productivity, whose match-specific productivity undergoes
the strongest selection, which decreases the cyclicality of wages of job stayers.
Table 2.4: Wage Cyclicality Estimates for Model-Generated Wages, No Hiring Cost
pˆi −2.54
pˆiU 0.09
Notes: Average values from 5 simulations of 2400 monthly observa-
tions on 20000 workers with 51 possible match-specific productivities.
The second empirical finding of the previous chapter is that unemployment at the beginning
of employment and the subsequent risk of separation are negatively related. For comparison with
model outcomes, I estimate the Cox (1972) model using simulated unemployment and job dura-
tions. The hazard rate hid for match i after d periods from hiring takes the functional form
hid = h˜dexp(αu
start
i + id) (2.11)
where h˜d is the baseline hazard rate common to all matches and ustarti is the unemployment rate at
the creation of match i. Table 2.5 shows averages of estimates of Equation 2.11.
Table 2.5: Estimates for Job Duration
αˆ −0.61
Notes: Average values from 5 simulations of 2400 monthly observa-
tions on 20000 workers with 51 possible match-specific productivities.
Finally, I illustrate the responses of wages to productivity changes: Figure 2.2 shows the simu-
lated response of mean wages to a positive shock to aggregate productivity, and Figure 2.3 shows
the simulated response of mean wages to a negative shock to aggregate productivity.
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As seen in Figure 2.2, after the shock the mean wages of job stayers and new hires increase. The
mean wages wages of job stayers are higher than for new hires, due to the presence of workers that
were survived or were hired during previous episodes of low productivity, and gradually decrease
to the mean wages of new hires as the share of workers hired during the current episode of high
productivity.
Conversely, as Figure 2.3 shows, after the shock the mean wages of job stayers and new hires
decrease. The mean wages wages of job stayers are lower than for new hires, due to the presence
of workers that were hired during previous episodes of high productivity, and gradually increase
to the mean wages of new hires as the share of workers hired during the current episode of low
productivity.
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0 20 40 60
time
Mean, New Hires  Realized Mean, New Hires
 Realized Mean, Job Stayers
Notes: The series are normalized by the mean wage for new hires in the low pro-
ductivity state. The series start with the economy in the low productivity state and
depict a simulated response of the mean wage for job stayers and the mean wages
for new hires, realized and expected, to a positive change in aggregate productivity.
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0 20 40 60
time
Mean, New Hires  Realized Mean, New Hires
 Realized Mean, Job Stayers
Notes: The series are normalized by the mean wage for new hires in the high pro-
ductivity state. The series start with the economy in the high productivity state and
depict a simulated response of the mean wage for job stayers and the mean wages
for new hires, realized and expected, to a negative change in aggregate productivity.
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2.5 Conclusions
The match quality selection effect arises in a standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and
matching model with two additional features: match-specific productivity and turnover costs. The
cyclical selection on match quality explains the empirical findings of the previous chapter, the
wages of new hires being less procyclical than the wages of job stayers, and a negative relationship
between the initial unemployment rate and the subsequent risk of separation.
More generally, these two fairly realistic features could generate the same selection effect in
models with different wage-setting mechanisms. An example would be a model with staggered
multiperiod Nash bargaining in which workers’ wages are negotiated for the first time when they
are hired.5 Without the selection effect, the wages of new hires would be more procyclical than
the wages of job stayers, which are not fully flexible. With the selection effect induced by match-
specific productivities and turnover costs, the observed procyclicality of the wages of new hires
relative to job stayers would be attenuated. The estimation of the cyclicality of model-generated
wages could lead to an incorrect conclusion that the wages of new hires were no more or not much
more procyclical than the wages of job stayers.
The empirical results of the previous chapter suggest that the match quality selection effect
is stronger for hires from employment than from unemployment. The on-the-job search can be
incorporated into the model to account for job-to-job transitions. In the present form, the model
would not generate the stronger selection effect for hires from employment than for hires from un-
employment. However, a conceptually easy modification should resolve this issue. For simplicity,
I made match-specific productivity an inspection good, known to workers and firms immediately
upon meeting. I could relax this assumption, making match-specific productivity partially an ex-
5Unlike Gertler and Trigari (2009), where workers hired in-between wage renegotiations receive the ongoing wage.
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perience good. Then, worker-firm pairs receive a signal about match-specific productivity upon
meeting. If they agree to form a match, the underlying productivity is revealed during first few
months of its duration.6 For hires from unemployment, the same force driving the selection effect
in the baseline model appears in the generalized model. For hires from employment, the selection
effect is enhanced: during downturns, the employed workers are concerned about a risk of job loss
in a new match, since unemployment spells are longer in expectation, and demand a higher signal
about match quality to accept an offer of a job-job transition.
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Appendix A: Equilibrium Existence
The equilibrium operator, denoted as T , is defined by the equations (2.3)-(2.5). I use notation
P (y) = p(θ(y)) for the composite vacancy-meeting probability, and subscript S for the depen-
dence on S, writing T as
T S(y, z) =r(y, z)− b+ βE
[
(1− δ)1{S(yˆ, z) ≥ 0}S(yˆ, z)−
P S(yˆ)
∫






−1(c/J˜S(y)), if J˜(y) ≥ c




1{(1− τ)S(y, z) ≥ h}((1− τ)S(y, z)− h)dFZ(z).
The operator T is not continuous. There are at most two sources of discontinuity: the compo-
nents 1{(1− τ)S(y, z) ≥ h}τS(y, z) and, potentially, the vacancy-meeting probability P S(y).7








(1− τ)S(y, z)− h), if 0 ≤ (1− τ)S(y, z)− h ≤ d
1, otherwise,
where d is a small positive number.
The function a has an intuitive explanation in the context of job creation decisions: when a
firm’s share of surplus does not cover the hiring cost, a job is not created; when a firm’s share of
7The components 1{S(y, z) ≥ 0}S(y, z) and 1{(1−τ)S(y, z) ≥ h}((1−τ)S(y, z)−h) are continuous with respect
to S, similarly to a function 1{x ≥ 0}x, which is continuous with respect to x.
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surplus is noticeably higher than the hiring cost, a job is created; when a firm’s share of surplus is
only slightly higher than the hiring cost, a job creation decision is randomized, with the creation
probability increasing in the net profit from job creation.
The second potential source of discontinuity is the vacancy-meeting probability, P S(y). Under
certain regularity conditions on q and p, which are satisfied for a matching function M(u, v) =
uv
(uη+vη)1/η
, the function P S(y) depends continuosly on S. However, for the calibration exercise
I use the Cobb-Douglas matching function M(u, v) = κuηv(1−η), which makes θS(y) jump at






















, if c+ ce ≥ J˜(y) ≥ c
1, if J˜(y) ≥ c+ ce,
where e is a small positive number. The replacement function P˜ S(y) is equal to P S(y) when
J˜S(y) /∈ (c, c+ ce) and depends continuously on S.8 This modification corresponds to a situation
where some workers decide against looking for a job when economic conditions are so bad that the
net expected firm’s profit from vacancy creation conditional on meeting a worker is close to zero,
and where the proportion of such workers approaches zero continuously when the net expected
firm’s profit from vacancy creation conditional on meeting a worker approaches zero.
8Truncating the matching function M(u, v) = κuηv(1−η) ≤ min{u, v} leads to restriction PS(y), P˜S(y) ≤ 1.
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I define the proxy equilibrium operator as
T˜ S(y, z) =r(y, z)− b+ βE
[






where P˜ S = P S if functions p, q satisfy certain regularity conditions, and where P˜ S is defined by
equation (2.12) for the Cobb-Douglas matching function.
An equilibrium of the (proxy) model is a fixed point of an operator, T˜ , that maps a functional
space, S, into itself. To prove the existence of an equilibrium using the Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem, I show that the space S contains its own image under T˜ , that the space is convex and
compact, and that the operator T˜ is continuous.
I define the space of potential surplus functions, S , by the condition S ∈ S iff S : Y × Z →
[S, S]. The space is endowed with the maximum norm. The bounds
S =
(






S = r(y1, z1)− b− βτS.
are such that the space S contains its own image under T˜ . It is easily checked that if S ≤ S(y, z) ≤
S for all y, z, then S ≤ T˜ S(y, z) ≤ S for all y, z follows .
Compactness of S follows from the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem applied to [S, S]|Y×Z|, since
set Y × Z is finite. Convexity of S is obvious.
It remains to prove that the operator T˜ is continuous.
Lemma 2.5.1. The operator T˜ is continuous, if (1) P˜ S = P S , p is a differentiable function with
a derivative which is bounded and bounded away from zero, and q an invertible and differentiable
function with a derivative that is bounded away from zero on [0, A], for all A <∞, with q(0) = 1.
The operator T˜ is continuous, if (2) P˜ S is defined by the equation (2.12).
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Proof. It is sufficient to show that there exists constant D such that
|T S2(y, z)− T S1(y, z)| ≤ D||S1 − S2||
for all S1, S2 ∈ S and all y ∈ Y , z ∈ Z.
Examination of the definition of T˜ reveals that it suffices to prove that
|P˜ S2(y)− P˜ S2(y)| ≤ C||S2 − S1||.
for some constant C.
In the case (1), when functions p, q satisfy some regularity conditions, it is sufficient to prove
the existence of constants A, B such that
|θS2(y)− θS1(y)| ≤ A||S1 − S2||,
|p(θS2(y))− p(θS1(y))| ≤ B|θS2(y)− θS1(y)|,
because then C = AB satisfies the required condition. Since p is differentiable with a derivative
that is bounded and bounded away from zero, constant B = maxx∈[0,∞)|p′(x)| can be used.
The last step is to show that A = maxx∈[1,S]| 1q′(q−1(x) |/c satisfies the required condition.
There are four cases to consider: J˜S2(y), J˜S1(y) ≥ c, J˜S2(y) ≥ c > J˜S1(y), J˜S1(y) ≥ c >
J˜S2(y) and c > J˜S2(y), J˜S1(y). It holds that J˜S is bounded from above by S and that |J˜S2(y)) −
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J˜S1(y)| ≤ ||S1 − S2||. In the first case, it holds that


























q′(q−1(x) | ∗ |(J˜
S1(y)− J˜S2(y))/c|
≤ A||S1 − S2||.
In the second case, we have that θS1(y) = 0, and similar steps as above applied with substitution
of 0 for θS1(y) yield
|θS2(y)− θS1(y)| = |θS2(y)− 0| = |q−1(c/J˜S2(y))− q−1(1)|
≤ maxx∈[1,S]|
1








q′(q−1(x) | ∗ (J˜
S2(y))− J˜S1(y)))/c
≤ A||S1 − S2||.
The third case is analogous. Finally, in the fourth case, we have that |θS2(y)− θS1(y)| = 0.
In the case (2), when P˜ S is defined by the equation (2.12), there are five cases to consider:
J˜S2(y), J˜S1(y) ≥ c + ce, J˜S2(y) ≥ c + ce ≥ J˜S1(y) ≥ c, c + ce ≥ J˜S2(y), J˜S1(y) ≥ c,
c + ce ≥ J˜S2(y) ≥ c ≥ J˜S1(y) and c > J˜S2(y), J˜S1(y). In each of these cases, it is easy to find
Ci, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, such that |P˜ S2(y)− P˜ S2(y)| ≤ Ci||S2−S1||. The largest of Ci is the desired
constant C.
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Appendix B: Monotone Iteration
To narrow down the set of possible equilibria, I use a method known in numerical functional
analysis, discussed in Collatz (1966). Consider a functional operator T : S → S, where S is a
space of real-valued functions from X to a compact set, which contains bounds S, S ∈ S such
that ∀x∈X S(x) ≤ S(x) ≤ S(x).
Suppose that T can be decomposed into an increasing (monotone) operator T 1 and a decreasing
(antitone) operator T 2: there are T 1, T 2 : S → S such that ∀x∈X T (x) = T 1(x) + T 2(x)
and such that if ∀x∈X S1(x) ≤ S2(x) for S1, S2 ∈ T , then ∀x∈X T 1S1(x) ≤ T 1S1(x) and
T 1S1(x) ≥ T 1S1(x).
We can define two sequences of functions, Sn and Sn, where the nitial elements are S0 = S
and S0 = S. The subsequent elements are defined as
Sn+1 = T 1Sn + T 2Sn
and
Sn+1 = T 1Sn + T 2Sn.
Lemma 2.5.2. The inequalities
S0(x) ≤ S1(x) ≤ ... ≤ Sn(x) ≤ Sn(x) ≤ ... ≤ S1(x) ≤ S0(x)
hold for all n ∈ N and x ∈ X .
Proof. By induction. The inequality S0(x) ≤ S0(x) holds by assumption. From Sn(x) ≤ Sn(x)
it follows that
Sn+1(x) = T 1Sn(x) + T 2Sn(x) ≤ T 1Sn(x) + T 2Sn(x) = Sn+1(x)
from the monotone properties of T 1, T 2.
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Lemma 2.5.3. For any fixed point S∗ of the operator T and any n ∈ N, the inequalities
Sn(x) ≤ S∗(x) ≤ Sn(x)
hold for all x ∈ X .
Proof. By induction. The inequality S(x) = S0(x) ≤ S∗(x) ≤ S0(x) = S(x) holds by assump-
tion. From Sn(x) ≤ S∗(x) ≤ Sn(x), it follows that
Sn+1(x) = T 1Sn(x) + T 2Sn(x) ≤ S∗(x) ≤ T 1Sn(x) + T 2Sn(x) = Sn+1(x)
from the monotone properties of T 1, T 2.
From the first lemma, it follows that, for all x ∈ X , an ascending and bounded from above
sequence Sn(x) and a descending and bounded from below sequence Sn(x) have limits, S(x) and
S(x), since functions from the space S have values in a compact set. Consequently, it is possible
to numerically narrow down the set of fixed points of T , by constructing Sn and Sn and finding
their limits, which is done by iteration.
Both the original operator T and the proxy operator T˜ are decomposable into monotone and
antitone parts. For the operator T , these parts are T 1 and T 2 such that
(T 1S)(y, z) = r(y, z)− b+ βE
[
(1− δ)1{S(yˆ, z) ≥ 0}S(yˆ, z)
]
and




1{(1− τ)S(yˆ, zˆ) ≥ h}τS(yˆ, zˆ)dFZ(zˆ)
]
.
For the operator T˜ , these parts are T˜ 1 and T˜ 2 such that
(T˜ 1S)(y, z) = r(y, z)− b+ βE
[













Dynamics of Wages Around Job Transitions
3.1 Introduction
Job-to-job transitions are a widespread feature of the labor market. A fraction of job-to-job tran-
sitions associated with a wage cut is surprisingly large, ranging from one fifth to more than one
third. In the German dataset used in this paper, the fraction of such transitions is 31%.1 This
phenomenon is a challenge for labor market models.
The goal is to empirically investigate the previously proposed explanations, using administra-
tive German microdata that provide information on whole employment history of a large sample of
workers recorded at daily frequency. I compare the evolution of wages for continuously employed
workers, workers making a job-to-job (EE) transition, workers making a job-unemployment-job
(EUE) transition, and workers who experience separation followed by a longer period of non-
employment.2
1Jolivet et al. (2006) use the data from the ECHP for Europe and the PSID for the US, concluding that in the 1990s
the fraction of such transition ranged from 20% in Belgium to 36% in Germany, and was 23% in the US. Tjaden and
Wellschmied (2014) find that the fraction to 34% in the PSID data from the 1990s, with the average wage cut of 20%.
Other papers find similar values for the fraction of wage-decreasing wage cuts.
2Workers are classified as making an EE transition if they are observed leaving a job and starting another without
registering as unemployed within a short period, which is 0 to 9 days for most of the paper. Workers who register as
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Wage changes associated with transitions are compared to wage changes within employment
spells. I find that wage changes associated with EE transitions and within-spell changes show
similar patterns across time and demographic groups. The fraction of wage cuts for EE transitions,
31%, is not drastically higher than for within-spell changes, 26%. In contrast, the fraction of cuts
is 47% for EUE transitions.
One group of explanations wage cuts associated with EE transitions posits that workers move
to a new job to escape a deteriorating match or to avoid an even worse situation in the future. In the
model of Moscarini (2005), continuous learning about initially unknown match quality can lead to
gradual deterioration of wages and eventual separation. In Nagypal (2005a), large shocks can lower
the value of a job, leading to an immediate separation or at least increased likelihood of a smaller
shock triggering separation. Alternatively, a reallocation shock, nicknamed ”Godfather shock,”
can force workers to choose between a random outside offer and unemployment, as in Jolivet,
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006). Unlike a pure reallocation shock, a worsening job situation could
manifest as lowering of wages or wage growth.
Examining the evolution of wages before separation, I find that wages deteriorate in the months
leading to separation, for all types of separations, even job-to-job transitions. The wage deteriora-
tion manifests in the year preceding transition as slower wage growth and lowering of real wages
conditioned on workers’ characteristics. Wage growth for workers who avoid separation is 3%. Be-
fore EE and EUE transitions, yearly wage growth is lower by half and two-thirds, respectively. For
other separations, wage growth is slightly negative. Real wages adjusted for workers’ characteris-
tics are lowered by 0.6% a year before separation, and lowered by 2-3% in the last pre-separation
quarter. For EE transitions, wages are lowered by 0.5% half a year before separation, and by
unemployed before or after separation and start a new job within a period of the same length are classified as making
an EUE transition.
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around 1.5% immediately before separation. Other types of separations are preceded by more
wage deterioration. The observed wage deterioration supports the notion some of separations are
preceded by a worsening job situation, even for job-to-job transitions.
Another group of explanations proposes that workers move to a lower-paying job in the ex-
pectation of obtaining higher wages in the future. This motive arises if firms offer an increasing
wage-tenure profile, as in Coles and Burdett (2010) extension of the Burdett-Mortensen wage post-
ing model; if some firms offer attractive opportunities for accumulation of firm-specific or general
human capital; and in the Bertrand competition framework introduced in Robin and Postel-Vinay
(2002). In this framework, workers have no bargaining power, receiving take-it-or-leave-it offers
from firms. Wage growth results from the Bertrand competition in which firms engage when a
worker receives an outside offer, within the limit dictated by productivity in the current job. A
worker might make a job-to-job transition because of the option value of working for a more pro-
ductive firm with higher wage ceiling, despite the initial wage being lower.
Examining the evolution of wages after accession, I find that after EE transitions wages grow
faster for workers who accept an initial wage cut. Wage growth is negatively correlated with the
initial wage for all workers, and positively with previous wage for workers who move between
jobs. However, the finding on wage growth after EE transitions is robust to controlling for initial
and previous wages. This effect is not present for EUE transitions.
The findings of the paper suggest that both motivations for a job-to-job transition accompanied
by a wage cut are plausible. The observed wage deterioration indicates that some of separations
are preceded by a worsening job situation, even for job-to-job transitions. The positive correlation
between wage growth and the initial wage cut for job-to-job transitions suggests that at least some
of workers might accept lower initial wages in the exchange for higher future wage growth.
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3.2 Previous Empirical Findings
Job-to-job transitions accompanied by a wage cut are a pervasive phenomenon in the labor markets.
Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) use panels of worker data for 10 European countries and the
US, the European Community Household Panel and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the
mid-1990s. They find that the fraction of job-to-job transitions associated with a wage cut ranges
from around 18% in Portugal to 36% in Germany. The wage cuts exceed 10% for 10% to 20% of
transitions for most of the considered countries, with 29% in France, and exceed 20% for between
7% and 20% of transitions. Their explanation for these transition is the presence of reallocation
shocks, which force workers to choose between a random outside offer and unemployment.
Lopes de Melo (2007) looks at wage dynamics using the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income
Program and Participation. He finds a significant amount of wage cuts and more wage movements,
both downward and upward, in job-to-job transitions than for job stayers, with higher variance.
Wage growth is compared for workers that undertake a job-to-job transition with a wage decrease
in the first observed year and workers who keep their job initially, but experience a transition
afterwards. Wage growth is higher for the stayers in the low education group, but appears to be
lower in the high education group, supporting the notion that a wage cut might be accepted in the
expectation of higher future wages. The caveat is, however, a small sample size: the 4-year wage
growth is examined for 134 job-to-job transitions with wage cuts in the low education group and
34 in the high education group.
Tjaden and Wellschmied (2014) find that one third of job-to-job transitions are associated with
a wage cut in data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation for the 1993-1995 and
1996-1999. Additionally, workers who experience a wage cut are more likely to change jobs again.
Canon and Pavan (2014) investigate what happens to wages of workers before they make a job-
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to-job transition. They use two measures of compensation from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth datasets 1979: usual wages earned and total labor earnings during the previous year.
They find evidence that wages decrease before a job-to-job transition, and argue that experiencing
a negative productivity and wage shock are more likely to change jobs. Additionally, they use the
1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation to investigate dynamics of monthly
labor income. They use dummies for future and past labor market transitions within the next 6
months and the previous 6 months. Workers who experience a transition in the recent past or the
imminent future experience a within-job wage growth 1% lower than stayers, in both cases.
Additional explanations for job-to-job transitions accompanied by wage cuts were investigated.
Workers might make a transition for non-pecuniary reasons, moving to a job that they value more
despite worse pay. Fujita (2010) finds that in the UK workers who are unsatisfied with non-
pecuniary characteristics of their job are roughly half of workers who search on the job and give job
dissatisfaction as a reason. The workers unsatisfied for non-pecuniary reasons obtain on average
lower wages conditional on moving than workers who search on the job due to low pay. Hall and
Mueller (2018) find that non-wage value of a job plays an important role for the job-acceptance
decisions of unemployed job seekers in the US. Sorkin (2018) finds evidence for movement to
lower-paying firms suggestive of compensating differentials in US administrative data. Addition-
ally, the observed wage cuts might be an artifact of measurement error, which was investigated in
Canon and Pavan (2014).
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3.3 Data
I use German administrative microdata, the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies for
1975-2010, which is 2% sample of German workers3 provided by the Research Data Centre of the
Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research. A detailed description of
the dataset is provided in vom Berge, Koenig and Seth (2013).
For each worker, I have information on all employment spells covered by social security be-
tween 1975 and 2010: an establishment identifier, sex, education, location, working hours (full-
time or part-time), employment status (indicators for special status such as traineeship, partial
retirement and others), daily earnings, and other information. Job tenure can be precisely calcu-
lated. Every time conditions of employment change, a notification has to be submitted to the social
security system. Consequently, workers are observed at effectively daily frequency.
I restrict the sample to men between 25 and 54 years of age. The restriction is adopted for com-
parability with earlier studies. The lower bound of 25 years is customary, the upper bound of 54
years is lower than the usual bound of 60 years, in this case chosen to avoid issues raised by early
retirement. I further restrict the sample to employment spells in which a worker is employed con-
tinuously (with no gaps), as a full-time non-trainee, and without any parallel employment. Such
spells are more than a half of all employment spells. To calculate wage changes associated with
movement to a different job, I restrict the sample to movement to jobs in which a worker is initially
employed as a full-time non-trainee, and without any parallel employment. To investigate wage
dynamics after movement to a different job, I restrict the sample to movement from jobs in which
a worker was employed at the end of a spell as a full-time non-trainee, and without any parallel
employment. The observations with daily earnings above the legally mandated contribution as-
3Individuals appear in underlying data if at least once in the 1975-2010 period they are employees covered by the
social security system or register as unemployed, job seekers or benefit recipients.
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sessment ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze) are top-coded. Wages are defined as nominal daily
earnings of full-time workers. I calculate wage changes within and between employment spells
only for uncensored observations.
3.4 Empirical Results
This section starts with statistics on wage changes within employment spells, which serve as a
benchmark for wage changes associated with transitions. Then, dynamics of wages before separa-
tions and after accessions are examined.
3.4.1 Wage Changes Within Employment Spells
To provide a benchmark for wage changes experienced by workers moving between jobs, I estab-
lish the properties of wage changes within employment spells. The fraction of wage cuts is 26%
for all workers and stable across age groups, but much lower, 15%, for university-educated workers
than for the rest. Over the considered period, the fraction of wage cuts shows an upward trend. The
mean and dispersion of wage changes is higher for younger and less educated workers. Overall,
the mean wage change is 3%, with the standard deviation of 0.14. The mean wage decrease is
-8.7% and the mean wage increase is 7.1%. The results are summarized in Table 3.1.
For workers aged 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, the fraction of cuts is similar, close to 26%. Wage
changes are on average larger and more dispersed for the youngest workers. The results are sum-
marized in Table 3.2.
When workers are divided into groups with and without university education, the fraction of
cuts turns out to be much lower, 15%, in the high-education group, than in the low-education group,
28%. For the high-education group, wages changes are slightly larger with smaller dispersion. The
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results are summarized in Table 3.3.
Since the sample covers 20 years, the properties of wage changes might have changed over
time. The statistics computed for each year separately turn out to be relatively stable over time,
excluding the first five years of the considered period. However, the fraction of cuts was higher in
the 2000s than the 1990s, 28% to 22%. In years 1990-1994, the fraction of cuts was noticeably
lower, 13%-24% in a year, than in 1995-2009, when it ranged from 24% to 34%. The mean and
dispersion of wage changes was slightly lower the later decade. The mean of wage changes in
1990-1994 ranged from 3.6% to 6%, in 1995-2009, from 1.3% to 3.7%. Unsurprisingly, the mean
wage change was the lowest in 2008, with the fraction of decreases close to the maximum observed
in the whole period. The results are summarized in Table 3.24.
The wage changes are not distributed uniformly over a year. More than 40% of all wage
changes observed in a year happen in December. The December wage changes have slightly higher
standard deviation and fraction of wage decreases. However, the differences are small. The results
are summarized in Table 3.25.
Table 3.1: Wage Changes for Job Stayers
Changes Changes Changes Decreases Decreases Increases
N Mean St. Dev. Fraction Mean Mean
1924654 0.0302 0.14 25.88 -0.0873 0.0713
Notes: Mean in log points, fraction in percentage points.
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Table 3.2: Wage Changes for Job Stayers, by Age Group
Age Changes Changes Changes Decreases Decreases Increases
N Mean St. Dev. Fraction Mean Mean
25-34 647838 0.0405 0.16 25.88 -0.1001 0.0896
35-44 756636 0.0268 0.13 25.74 -0.0826 0.0647
45-54 520180 0.0224 0.12 26.08 -0.0783 0.0579
Notes: Mean in log points, fraction in percentage points.
Table 3.3: Wage Changes for Job Stayers, by Education
University Changes Changes Changes Decreases Decreases Increases
N Mean St. Dev. Fraction Mean Mean
No 11560419 0.0286 0.14 28.36 -0.0888 0.0750
Yes 364235 0.0374 0.12 15.27 -0.0750 0.0576
Notes: Mean in log points, fraction in percentage points.
3.4.2 Wage Changes for Transitions
For transitions, the fraction of wage cuts is 31% for EE transitions and 47% for EUE transitions.
The fraction of wage cuts for EE transitions is not drastically higher than 26% found for within-
spell wage changes. The mean wage change for EE transitions, 5.8%, is almost twice the mean
for within-spell changes, and dispersion is correspondingly higher. For EUE transition, the mean
wage change is 0.1% and dispersion is much higher than for EE transitions and job stayers. The
results are summarized in Table 3.4.
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Across age and education groups, wage changes associated with EE transitions show similar
patterns to within-spell changes. The fraction of cuts is similar for workers aged 25-34, 35-44, 45-
54, but higher for low-education workers, 33%, than for high-education workers, 26%. The mean
and dispersion of changes are larger for younger workers, the mean is slightly, and dispersion
noticeably, larger for low-education than for high-education workers. The results are summarized
in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
As for within-spell wage changes, the fraction of cuts associated with EE transitions shows an
upward trend in 1990-2009, while the mean and dispersion were relatively stable. In contrast to
within-spell changes, the fraction of cuts for EE transitions, was below the mean, 29%, in 2008,
but reached the maximum in the sample, 36.6%, in 2009, with the smallest observed mean. The
results are summarized in Table 3.26.
EE transitions are less concentrated in December than within-spell wage changes, with 26% on
average happening at the end of year. The mean and dispersion of wage changes, and the fraction
of wage cuts, are higher in the January-November period than in December An exception was
2009, when the mean change in the first 11 months was roughly equal to the mean for December,
with the fraction of cuts reaching the maximum in the sample. The results are summarized in Table
3.27.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the distributions of wage changes within spells and for EE and EUE
transitions.
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Figure 3.1: Wage Changes
Figure 3.2: Wage Changes in December
72
Table 3.4: Wage Changes for EE and EUE Transitions
Type Changes Changes Changes Decreases Decreases Increases
N Mean St. Dev. Fraction Mean Mean
EE 261186 0.0578 0.26 31.36 -0.1622 0.1583
EUE 17584 0.0008 0.35 47.09 -0.2344 0.2101
Notes: Restricted to uncensored observations, and full-time, non-trainee, sole employment after the transi-
tion. Mean in log points, fraction in percentage points.
Table 3.5: Wage Changes for EE Transitions, by Age
Age Changes Changes Changes Decreases Decreases Increases
N Mean St. Dev. Fraction Mean Mean
25-34 109738 0.0770 0.28 30.68 -0.1798 0.1906
35-44 94896 0.0485 0.24 31.64 -0.1530 0.1418
45-54 56552 0.0361 0.23 32.22 -0.1450 0.1222
Notes: Restricted to uncensored observations, and full-time, non-trainee, sole employment after the tran-
sition. Mean in log points, fraction in percentage points.
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Table 3.6: Wage Changes for EE Transitions, by Education
University Changes Changes Changes Decreases Decreases Increases
N Mean St. Dev. Fraction Mean Mean
No 215539 0.0588 0.27 32.60 -0.1716 0.1702
Yes 45647 0.0532 0.20 25.51 -0.1057 0.1076
Notes: Restricted to uncensored observations, and full-time, non-trainee, sole employment after the transition.
Mean in log points, fraction in percentage points.
3.4.3 Pre-Separation Wage Dynamics
The evolution of wages before separation is investigated to examine whether movement between
jobs, in particular job-to-job transitions, are induced by worsening of an existing match. I find that
wages deteriorate in the months leading to separation, for all types of separations. The deterioration
is visible in lowered wage growth in the year preceding separation, and as lowered wage levels.
For EE transitions, the deterioration is weaker, but still present.
The yearly mean wage growth is 3% for workers who avoid separation, 1.8% for workers who
make an EE transition, 0.9% for workers who make an EUE transition, and -0.1 for workers who
undergo separation of different type, as shown in Table 3.7.
To check if differences in wage growth are not driven by composition of workers’ groups, I
estimate the equation






it + βxit + it (3.1)
where ∆log wit is the year-on-year difference in log wages for worker i in month t, αEEit , α
EUE
it ,
αSit are fixed effects for undergoing an EE transition, an EUE transition, or other separation, re-
spectively. The vector of controls, xit, contains tenure, an education-specific quadratic polynomial
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in age, and federal state and month fixed effects. The results from the regression, shown in Table
3.8, indicate that the differences in wage growth are robust to controlling for compositional effects.
The deterioration in wages is stronger immediately before separation. To examine the evolution






δj,kit + βyit + it (3.2)
where wit is wage for worker i in month t, δ
j,k
it are fixed effect for months in which worker i is k
months before separation of type j. The vector of controls, yit, contains a quadratic polynomial
in tenure, an education-specific cubic polynomial in age, and federal state and month fixed effects,
and a match fixed effect specific for a worker-firm pair. Equation 3.2 conditions wages on workers’
characteristics, average wages for a worker-firm pair and the overall wage level. Consequently, the
fixed effects for pre-separation months capture deterioration in expected real wages.
The results from the estimation of Equation 3.2 without differentiating between separations,
shown in column (1) of Table 3.9, indicate that on average wages are the lower, the closer is sepa-
ration, with deterioration by 0.6% a year before separation, and by 2-3% in the last pre-separation
quarter. The results from the estimation of Equation 3.2 with separations divided between EE
transitions, EUE transitions and other separations, shown in columns (2)-(4) of Table 3.9, indicate
that for EE transitions the deterioration starts later and is weaker than for other transitions. The
differences between EUE transitions and remaining separations are small.
Wage dynamics before job-to-job transitions with a gap of 0-9 days are markedly different than
for other separations. Additional regressions estimated, but not included, for workers undergoing
movement between jobs with and without unemployment registration with an employment gap of
10-31 and 32-93 days show that pre-separation wage dynamics for these group are similar to wage
dynamics preceding EUE with a gap of 0-9 days.
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Table 3.7: Wage Growth Pre-Separation
Status N Mean St. Dev.
Stayers 19229442 0.0302 0.0952
EE 157582 0.0177 0.1345
EUE 9181 0.0089 0.1658
Other 145317 -0.0007 0.1992




Notes:* p< .1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; month-clustered standard errors in parentheses; 18908000 monthly
observations for 424238 worker-firm pairs, 265093 workers, 237397 firms, 149306 EE transitions, 8546 EUE
transitions and 139271 remaining separations.
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Table 3.9: Pre-Separation Wage Dynamics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Month All Separations EE Transitions EUE Transitions Other Separations
0 -0.0292*** -0.0155*** -0.0349*** -0.0436***
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0015)
1 -0.0253*** -0.0135*** -0.0324*** -0.0383***
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0012)
2 -0.0224*** -0.0121*** -0.0310*** -0.0343***
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0010)
3 -0.0189*** -0.0092*** -0.0280*** -0.0302***
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0009)
4 -0.0169*** -0.0080*** -0.0262*** -0.0274***
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008)
5 -0.0152*** -0.0068*** -0.0245*** -0.0251***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0008)
6 -0.0129*** -0.0050*** -0.0230*** -0.0223***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0007)
7 -0.0113*** -0.0039*** -0.0213*** -0.0202***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0007)
8 -0.0096*** -0.0026*** -0.0194*** -0.0180***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0007)
9 -0.0075*** -0.0009 -0.0181*** -0.0154***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006)
10 -0.0060*** 0.0003 -0.0172*** -0.0134***
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006)
11 -0.0052*** 0.0009 -0.0174*** -0.0121***
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0005)
12 -0.0058*** -0.0015*** -0.0166*** -0.0104***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0004)
Notes:* p< .1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; month-clustered standard errors in parentheses; 25891874 monthly observations for 790450 worker-firm
pairs, 341403 workers, 414361 firms, with 259029 EE transitions, 18667 EUE transitions and 512754 remaining separations. The estimates of fixed
effects for months pre-separation, from estimation for pooled separations in column (1) and for separations divided into 3 groups in columns (2)-(4).
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3.4.4 Wage Dynamics After Transitions
The evolution of wages after movement between jobs is investigated to examine the plausibility
of the hypothesis that job-to-job transitions with wage cuts are undertaken in the expectation of
obtaining higher wages in the future. I find that for EE transitions wage growth is higher for
transitions associated with a wage cut.
Wages of workers whose wages initially decreased grow on average faster, for both EE and
EUE transitions, as summarized in Table 3.10. In general, wage growth is negatively correlated
with the initial wage, and, for workers who move between jobs, positively with previous wage.
Consequently, higher wage growth for transitions associated with a cut is expected. To check if
the relationship between wage cuts and subsequent growth is not fully driven by the initial and
preceding wages, I estimate the equation






where ∆klog wit is the difference of log wages of worker i in month t and month t − k, and
ρkit is a fixed effect for starting a job with lower wage than in the previous job. The vector of
controls, zit, contains tenure, an education-specific quadratic polynomial in age, and federal state
and month fixed effects, and initial and previous wages. The estimates of ρkit from estimating
Equation 3.3 separetely for workers making EE or EUE transitions and for k-month wage growth,
where k ∈ {3, 6, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 60}, are shown in Table 3.11.
The results for EE transitions indicate that wages of workers who accepted a wage cut grow
faster. After 3 months, the estimated difference in growth is 0.5%, with the raw difference of 1.9%
and the mean growth of 0.7% for all EE transitions; after 5 years, the difference in growth is 1.08%,
with the raw difference of 5.1% and the mean growth of 16.9%. The effect persists over time, but
becomes much smaller relative to overall wage growth. When the same equation is estimated for
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EUE transitions, the wage cut fixed effects are not significant.
Table 3.10: Wage Growth After Transitions
Type Month 3 6 12 18 24 36 48 60
EE N 235177 206309 162227 137252 112942 83909 64595 50991
Mean 0.7 1.5 4.1 5.8 7.9 11.2 13.9 16.9
EE ↑ N 155999 139790 111813 95531 78938 59133 46028 36419
Mean 0.1 0.5 2.7 4.3 6.4 9.5 12.3 15.2
EE ↓ N 64677 54137 41130 34031 28052 20501 15600 12238
Mean 2.0 3.7 6.6 8.6 10.7 14.1 17.0 20.1
EUE N 13509 10225 7049 5410 4188 2795 1917 1356
Mean 1.2 2.6 5.2 7.3 9.4 13.1 16.5 19.0
EUE ↑ N 6685 5229 3746 2903 2242 1490 1018 729
Mean 0.7 1.7 3.8 5.6 7.7 10.7 14.1 15.7
EUE ↓ N 5709 4129 2698 2055 1589 1070 748 521
Mean 1.8 3.8 6.7 9.2 11.0 15.0 18.3 22.1
Notes: Restricted to uncensored observations, and full-time, non-trainee, sole employment after the transition.
Mean in log points. The signs ↑ and ↓ indicate transitions associated with wage increases and decreases.
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Table 3.11: Wage Growth After Transitions
EE EUE
Month ρˆ N ρˆ N
3 0.0052*** 199737 0.0017 11536
(0.0007) (0.0023)
6 0.0076*** 176886 0.0011 8814
(0.0015) (0.0048)
12 0.0072*** 138571 0.0018 6046
(0.0024) (0.0068)
18 0.0094*** 118262 0.0077 4663
(0.0024) (0.0081)
24 0.0097*** 97014 0.0080 3575
(0.0028) (0.0103)
36 0.0111*** 72531 0.0101 2395
(0.0036) (0.0172)
48 0.0128*** 56215 0.0044 1647
(0.0045) (0.0214)
60 0.0108* 44520 0.0305 1155
(0.0057) (0.0262)
Notes:* p< .1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; standard errors in parentheses are clustered by intial month. The estimates of the coeficient
on the indicator for a wage-decreasing transition, separately for 3, 6, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 60 months after a transition and EE
and EUE transitions.
3.5 Conclusions
I examine plausibility of two leading explanations for job-to-job transitions associated with a wage
cut by looking at the evolution of wages before and after transition. I find that wages deteriorate in
months leading to transition, which supports the notion that workers move between jobs to escape
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a deteriorating match. However, wages grow faster for workers who accepted wage cuts, at least
after job-to-job transitions. Wage growth after movement between jobs associated with even short
unemployment is not positively associated with a wage cut.
Taken together, the findings suggest that both transitions induced by worsening of an existing
match, and acceptance of lower initial wage in the exchange for higher future wage growth are
present in the labor market.
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Appendix A: Samples
Table 3.12: Sample for Job Stayers
Spells Workers Firms Changes
864604 349879 451796 1924654
Table 3.13: Sample for Job Stayers, by Age Group
Age Spells Workers Firms Changes
25-34 423157 207979 265025 647838
35-44 353753 190797 226168 756636
45-54 232719 144893 154581 520180
Table 3.14: Sample for Job Stayers, by Education
University Spells Workers Firms Changes
No 742975 303986 412875 1560419
Yes 123672 59184 73441 364235
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Table 3.15: Sample for Job Stayers, by Year
Year Spells Workers Firms Changes
1990 109557 97969 66640 79799
1991 116279 104876 71270 84058
1992 154365 137149 94444 104759
1993 148404 133155 94775 98293
1994 145565 130626 95200 97999
1995 142544 128148 94250 94452
1996 140443 126828 93163 92769
1997 138613 125221 92749 91431
1998 138359 124929 92299 93479
1999 141756 126688 94391 96815
2000 145365 128756 95755 98362
2001 144415 129120 94594 101904
2002 138223 125810 90384 99733
2003 l32571 122165 86440 99809
2004 129430 119752 83794 95265
2005 126958 117607 81802 92321
2006 130948 120106 83236 87085
2007 137451 124400 86697 106653
2008 140696 127759 88312 105361
2009 139163 127665 68064 104307
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Table 3.16: Sample for Job Stayers in the 1990s, by Period
Period Spells Workers Firms Changes
1-11.1990 108392 97332 65961 754773
12.1990 86297 86249 51582 77595
1-11.1991 115257 104322 70621 809611
12.1991 92093 92053 55531 82212
1-11.1992 152955 136526 93534 995873
12.1992 118114 118036 72544 101488
1-11.1993 147022 132537 93867 942189
12.1993 113984 113903 72635 95288
1-11.1994 144013 129907 94168 942265
12.1994 113408 113291 73960 95732
1-11.1995 141071 127422 93341 902713
12.1995 110858 110771 72923 91804
1-11.1996 139125 126175 92918 893365
12.1996 108968 108898 72441 90628
1-11.1997 137106 124500 91853 867614
12.1997 107432 107364 71793 88738
1-11.1998 136796 124127 91343 879824
12.1998 108278 108192 72217 90880
1-11.1999 140160 125922 93398 886092
12.1999 109925 109827 73530 92232
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Table 3.17: Sample for Job Stayers in the 2000s, by Period
Period Spells Workers Firms Changes
1-11.2000 143575 127964 94714 909889
12.2000 111731 111627 73874 94829
1-11.2001 142996 128496 93736 918378
12.2001 111326 111244 72972 94010
1-11.2002 136965 125240 89592 908601
12.2002 108538 108468 70659 91622
1-11.2003 131365 121569 85713 888462
12.2003 106666 106603 69203 89448
1-11.2004 128240 119156 83048 874607
12.2004 105020 104969 67821 88326
1-11.2005 125682 116978 81032 850271
12.2005 105051 104985 67476 86984
1-11.2006 129561 119368 82432 776849
12.2006 108380 108298 69380 81453
1-11.2007 136032 123723 85892 936401
12.2007 112095 112017 71422 97138
1-11.2008 139421 127144 87539 968412
12.2008 115300 115239 73004 100112
1-11.2009 137857 127016 87283 953449
12.2009 115046 114969 73289 98094
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Table 3.18: Sample for Separations
Spells Workers Firms EE EUE Other
757159 320122 412558 271548 19318 466293
Table 3.19: Sample for Separations, by Age
Age Spells Workers Firms EE
25-34 318634 156033 217089 113941
35-44 246446 128996 176252 97579
45-54 148994 86425 111079 58043
Table 3.20: Sample for Separations, by Education
University Spells Workers Firms EE
No 659341 279922 377604 224103
Yes 97818 49823 62090 47445
88
Table 3.21: Sample for Separations, by Year
Year Spells Workers Firms EE
1990 30378 25710 25269 11876
1991 31924 27609 26616 11973
1992 47956 41950 37092 19109
1993 47038 41432 36944 17067
1994 45284 39690 36316 16259
1995 45224 39803 35755 17203
1996 43079 37878 34901 14486
1997 42098 37061 34369 13657
1998 40661 36141 33352 14440
1999 41438 36406 34046 15501
2000 43417 37938 35434 17561
2001 42637 37416 34991 16096
2002 38567 34203 31577 13277
2003 33602 30141 27671 10501
2004 31617 28538 25984 9667
2005 28573 25689 23552 8846
2006 28954 25858 23319 10412
2007 31322 27720 25160 12402
2008 31899 28005 25730 11764
2009 31491 27919 25359 9451
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Table 3.22: Sample for Separations in the 1990s, by Period
Period Spells Workers Firms EE
1-11.1990 24985 21135 21399 9279
12.1990 5393 5386 4670 2597
1-11.1991 26177 22650 22547 9231
12.1991 5747 5744 4952 2742
1-11.1992 38279 33551 31067 14230
12.1992 9677 9667 7489 4879
1-11.1993 37001 32644 30538 12222
12.1993 10037 10031 7732 4845
1-11.1994 34921 30677 29404 11690
12.1994 10363 10341 8252 4569
1-11.1995 33784 29622 28857 11512
12.1995 11440 11431 8164 5691
1-11.1996 33842 29860 28853 10164
12.1996 9237 9231 7149 4322
1-11.1997 33079 29211 28130 9731
12.1997 9019 9011 7293 3926
1-11.1998 31765 28355 27126 10363
12.1998 8896 8888 7257 4077
1-11.1999 33461 29621 28229 11723
12.1999 7977 7967 6894 3778
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Table 3.23: Sample for Separations in the 2000s, by Period
Period Spells Workers Firms EE
1-11.2000 35076 30916 29552 13245
12.2000 8341 8332 6979 4316
1-11.2001 34358 30343 29121 12031
12.2001 8279 8269 6909 4065
1-11.2002 30958 27641 26238 9568
12.2002 7609 7600 6188 3709
1-11.2003 26993 24341 23006 7561
12.2003 6609 6606 5467 2940
1-11.2004 25234 22888 21276 6948
12.2004 6383 6376 5448 2719
1-11.2005 22884 20682 19339 6512
12.2005 5689 5678 4906 2334
1-11.2006 23381 21048 19265 7783
12.2006 5573 5569 4793 2629
1-11.2007 26040 23284 21269 9810
12.2007 5282 5274 4669 2592
1-11.2008 26157 23175 21653 9342
12.2008 5742 5733 4967 2422
1-11.2009 25117 22419 20577 7300
12.2009 6374 6368 5526 2151
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Appendix B: Additional Statistics
Table 3.24: Wage Changes for Job Stayers, by Year
Year Changes Changes Changes Decreases Decreases Increases
N Mean St. Dev. Fraction Mean Mean
1990 79799 0.0604 0.13 12.62 -0.1234 0.0869
1991 84058 0.0526 0.13 15.06 -0.1036 0.0803
1992 104759 0.0569 0.14 19.30 -0.1049 0.0956
1993 98293 0.0359 0.15 23.82 -0.1024 0.0791
1994 97999 0.0426 0.14 20.22 -0.1014 0.0790
1995 94452 0.0209 0.14 27.70 -0.0998 0.0672
1996 92769 0.0203 0.12 29.01 -0.0812 0.0618
1997 91431 0.0230 0.16 27.77 -0.0907 0.0667
1998 93479 0.0295 0.17 24.07 -0.0929 0.06.83
1999 96815 0.0242 0.14 27.61 -0.0866 0.0665
2000 98362 0.0274 0.14 24.31 -0.0906 0.0653
2001 101904 0.0195 0.15 28.74 -0.0899 0.0636
2002 99733 0.03.68 0.13 28.78 -0.0806 0.0842
2003 99809 0.0145 0.13 33.64 -0.0785 0.0617
2004 95265 0.0175 0.13 30.39 -0.0784 0.0593
2005 92321 0.0253 0.12 27.25 -0.0731 0.0622
2006 87085 0.0333 0.13 28.45 -0.0771 0.0771
2007 106553 0.0308 0.13 26.25 -0.0732 0.0679
2008 105361 0.0130 0.13 33.30 -0.0853 0.0621
2009 104307 0.0275 0.13 25.67 -0.0773 0.0637
Notes: Mean in log points, fraction in percentage points.
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Table 3.25: Wage Changes for Job Stayers in the 1990s, by Period
Period Changes Changes Changes Decreases Decreases Increases
Fraction Mean St. Dev. Fraction Mean Mean
1-11.1990 81.02 0.0592 0.11 11.05 -0.1031 0.0794
12.1990 89.78 0.0602 0.12 12.32 -0.1087 0.0840
1-11.1991 80.63 0.0518 0.11 13.65 -0.0872 0.0738
12.1991 89.16 0.0526 0.11 14.78 -0.0935 0.0779
1-11.1992 75.16 0.0571 0.12 17.95 -0.0907 0.0895
12.1992 85.74 0.0549 0.13 19.33 -0.0993 0.0918
1-11.1993 73.53 0.0367 0.12 22.43 -0.0865 0.0723
12.1993 83.43 0.0353 0.13 23.62 -0.0943 0.0754
1-11.1994 75.08 0.0435 0.12 18.52 -0.0856 0.0729
12.1994 84.29 0.0426 0.13 20.08 -0.0932 0.0767
1-11.1995 73.49 0.0203 0.12 26.79 -0.0871 0.0597
12.1995 82.65 0.0196 0.13 27.69 -0.0946 0.0634
1-11.1996 73.36 0.0191 0.10 28.40 -0.0715 0.0550
12.1996 82.33 0.0192 0.11 28.97 -0.0794 0.0594
1-11.1997 72.13 0.0225 0.15 26.75 -0.0785 0.0594
12.1997 81.56 0.0208 0.16 27.91 -0.0888 0.0632
1-11.1998 73.37 0.0292 0.15 23.04 -0.0789 0.0616
12.1998 82.85 0.0290 0.16 23.77 -0.0893 0.0660
1-11.1999 72.76 0.0242 0.12 26.58 -0.0730 0.0594
12.1999 82.97 0.0220 0.13 27.79 -0.0819 0.0621
Notes: Mean in log points, fraction in percentage points.
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Table 3.26: Wage Changes for Job Stayers in the 2000s, by Period
Period Changes Changes Changes Decreases Decreases Increases
Fraction Mean St. Dev. Fraction Mean Mean
1-11.2000 73.36 0.0263 0.12 23.35 -0.0764 0.0576
12.2000 83.94 0.0258 0.13 24.22 -0.0875 0.0620
1-11.2001 73.31 0.0190 0.13 27.58 -0.0767 0.0554
12.2001 83.47 0.0157 0.14 28.54 -0.0863 0.0564
1-11.2002 73.98 0.0363 0.11 28.12 -0.0703 0.0780
12.2002 83.28 0.0337 0.12 28.96 -0.0777 0.0792
1-11.2003 74.00 0.0135 0.11 32.64 -0.0666 0.0524
12.2003 82.54 0.0079 0.12 34.43 -0.0762 0.0520
1-11.2004 73.96 0.0162 0.11 29.48 -0.0670 0.0511
12.2004 82.88 0.0126 0.12 30.88 -0.0756 0.0520
1-11.2005 72.78 0.0235 0.10 26.35 -0.0612 0.0538
12.2005 81.31 0.0224 0.12 27.30 -0.0707 0.0574
1-11.2006 65.22 0.0310 0.11 28.01 -0.0646 0.0682
12.2006 74.18 0.0298 0.12 28.56 -0.0748 0.0716
1-11.2007 75.89 0.0279 0.11 25.08 -0.0616 0.0579
12.2007 85.58 0.0260 0.12 26.14 -0.0718 0.0606
1-11.2008 75.83 0.0116 0.11 32.85 -0.0759 0.0545
12.2008 85.48 0.0097 0.12 33.79 -0.0833 0.0571
1-11.2009 74.38 0.0276 0.10 24.11 -0.0653 0.0571
12.2009 83.97 0.0255 0.11 25.16 -0.0747 0.0592
Notes: Mean in log points, fraction in percentage points.
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Table 3.27: Wage Changes for EE Transitions, by Year
Year Changes Changes Changes Decreases Decreases Increases
N Mean St. Dev. Fraction Mean Mean
1990 11133 0.0715 0.27 27.04 -0.1949 0.1702
1991 11353 0.0741 0.26 29.50 -0.1741 0.1779
1992 18463 0.1011 0.26 24.41 -0.1770 0.1910
1993 16124 0.0554 0.26 32.37 -0.1723 0.1644
1994 15596 0.0608 0.25 28.76 -0.1816 0.1587
1995 16405 0.0518 0.25 31.52 -0.1599 0.1492
1996 14178 0.0449 0.23 33.47 -0.1468 0.1413
1997 13300 0.0442 0.25 33.27 -0.1597 0.1459
1998 13948 0.0621 0.27 31.99 -0.1522 0.1629
1999 15005 0.0569 0.26 30.40 -0.1703 0.1561
2000 16983 0.0649 0.26 31.08 -0.1536 0.1634
2001 15534 0.0470 0.27 34.15 -0.1566 0.1526
2002 12868 0.0453 0.27 31.61 -0.1638 0.1419
2003 10139 0.0367 0.25 36.28 -0.1505 0.1433
2004 9340 0.0448 0.24 31.35 -0.1565 0.1367
2005 8520 0.0435 0.26 33.43 -0.1560 0.1436
2006 10007 0.0562 0.27 33.76 -0.1526 0.1626
2007 11946 0.0619 0.26 32.72 -0.1554 0.1676
2008 11322 0.0667 0.26 29.04 -0.1628 0.1606
2009 9022 0.0356 0.25 36.57 -0.1522 0.1438
Notes: Restricted to uncensored observations, and full-time, non-trainee, sole employment after the tran-
sition. Mean in log points, fraction in percentage points.
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Table 3.28: Wage Changes for EE Transitions in the 1990s, by Period
Period Changes Changes Changes Decreases Decreases Increases
N Mean St. Dev. Fraction Mean Mean
1-11.1990 792.82 0.0726 0.29 31.05 -0.2024 0.1967
12.1990 2412 0.0690 0.19 16.38 -0.1679 0.1154
1-11.1991 787.64 0.0746 0.29 33.17 -0.1980 0.2037
12.1991 2689 0.0647 0.19 19.23 -0.1562 0.1173
1-11.l992 1255.45 0.1035 0.29 28.69 -0.1967 0.2192
12.1992 4653 0.0866 0.18 16.33 -0.1404 0.1309
1-11.l993 1045.27 0.0610 0.29 36.41 -0.1991 0.2035
12.1993 4626 0.0417 0.16 23.19 -0.1262 0.0924
1-11.l994 100.1936 0.0637 0.28 32.61 -0.1997 0.1914
12.1994 4394 0.0510 0.16 20.87 -0.1229 0.0968
1-11.1995 989.18 0.0617 0.29 37.08 -0.1785 0.2030
12.1995 5524 0.0285 0.15 22.18 -0.1107 0.0681
1-11.1996 899.09 0.0511 0.26 37.60 -0.1651 0.1930
12.1996 4288 0.0272 0.14 25.77 -0.1013 0.0718
1-11.1997 859 0.0493 0.28 36.62 -0.1776 0.1915
12.1997 3851 0.0280 0.17 27.16 -0.1086 0.0789
1-11.1998 907.73 0.0661 0.30 36.55 -0.1678 0.1997
12.1998 3963 0.0502 0.20 21.55 -0.1171 0.0962
1-11.l999 1026.27 0.0648 0.29 32.46 -0.1964 0.1953
12.1999 3716 0.0374 0.20 26.10 -0.1178 0.0923
Notes: Restricted to uncensored observations, and full-time, non-trainee, sole employment after the transi-
tion. Mean in log points, fraction in percentage points.
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Table 3.29: Wage Changes for EE Transitions in the 2000s, by Period
Period Changes Changes Changes Decreases Decreases Increases
N Mean St. Dev. Fraction Mean Mean
1-11.2000 1160.27 0.0732 0.28 32.76 -0.1737 0.1915
12.2000 4220 0.0413 0.19 25.69 -0.1200 0.0970
1-11.2001 1049.45 0.0525 0.29 37.53 -0.1722 0.1975
12.2001 3990 0.0260 0.17 25.84 -0.1176 0.0760
1-11.2002 837 0.0433 0.30 34.97 -0.1970 0.1670
12.2002 3661 0.0480 0.16 25.92 -0.0954 0.0982
1-11.2003 658.73 0.0456 0.28 37.85 -0.1757 0.1905
12.2003 2893 0.090 0.14 33.74 -0.0981 0.0636
1-11.2004 606.73 0.0513 0.27 34.03 -0.1772 0.1686
12.2004 2666 0.0205 0.15 27.76 -0.1049 0.0688
1-11.2005 566.64 0.0470 0.28 36.10 -0.1757 0.1739
12.2005 2287 0.0338 0.19 28.60 -0.1002 0.0875
1-11.2006 675 0.0617 0.30 36.69 -0.1739 0.1974
12.2006 2582 0.0389 0.18 25.56 -0.1163 0.0922
1-11.2007 855.91 0.0655 0.28 35.05 -0.1719 0.1934
12.2007 2531 0.0482 0.19 23.94 -0.1191 0.1009
1-11.2008 813 0.0715 0.27 31.25 -0.1752 0.1930
12.2008 2379 0.0411 0.17 25.18 -0.1134 0.0930
1-11.2009 629.55 0.0354 0.27 40.43 -0.1667 0.1679
12.2009 2097 0.0352 0.18 25.04 -0.1115 0.0842
Notes: Restricted to uncensored observations, and full-time, non-trainee, sole employment after the transi-
tion. Mean in log points, fraction in percentage points.
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